Suchergebnisse

Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- The Changing Arctic -- Arctic Governance -- Asia in the Changing Arctic -- Theoretical Framework of This Book -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 2: China's Arctic Policy -- End of the Cold War and the Burgeoning of China's Arctic Policy -- "Omnidirectional Diplomacy" and China's Entrance into the Arctic -- China as a World Power and a "Near-Arctic State" -- External Environment -- Domestic Environment -- National Interests -- Bureaucratic Interests

Despite comparable levels of political participation between genders, a significant gender gap in political empowerment persists in Japan. Women demonstrate a tendency towards progressive perspectives, yet exhibit lower levels of political interest and knowledge. The advent of social media has given rise to a plethora of discourse surrounding its impact, particularly in relation to women's political engagement. Drawing on a survey of 1,723 respondents, this study examines gendered patterns in social media use and political engagement in Japan. Findings reveal that while Japanese women are active on Instagram, they seldom engage in political activities on the platform - unlike men, who are more likely to use social media for political purposes. Nevertheless, social media discussions can occasionally shift toward political topics, potentially heightening gender consciousness among women. This unexpected form of political communication, occurring within intimate online spaces, raises questions about its potential to foster political empowerment for Japanese women in the future.

Environmental aid has become a major component of development aid. We analyzed the contingent characters of environmental aid of Japan and South Korea using the definition of Williams, which regards aid policy as donor driven and autobiographical of the donor agencies and societies from which they sprang. Both Japan and South Korea consider environmental aid as an important tool of their diplomacy. A combination of a moral obligation and domestic, international, political, and economic interests underpin both countries' environmental aid policy. Seen from the stated policies and practices, both countries use accounts of their past as once-developing countries trying to catch up in their aid narrative. In this manner, the environmental aid of Japan and South Korea is autobiographic, reflecting their interpretation of their own development history and position in global politics.

Environmental aid has become a major component of foreign aid, as environmental degradation and climate change have arisen as global concerns. Japan contends it has committed itself to the protection of the global environment since the 90s, and environmental aid has been an important part of that effort. South Korea has recently become an emerging actor in the development aid community and has also started to market its green diplomacy through programs such as the Global Green Growth Institute. Meanwhile, both Japanese aid and Korean aid have been criticized for being driven by their economic interests rather than altruism and that they focus too strongly on infrastructure projects. Against this background, we aim to analyze and compare Japanese and Korean environmental aid to shed light on the influence that emerging agents of aid such as South Korea can bring to the political dynamics and the overall governance of environmental aid. In our analysis, we refer to the definition of Williams (2002), which regards aid policy as an 'autobiography' of donor countries. Using an 'autobiography' approach we examine five elements of Japanese and Korean environmental aid: The bureaucratic and institutional imperatives, the internal procedures and processes, the stated policies, the practices and particular attitude that underlie them, and the broader impulse behind aid. By moving away from an altruistic/self-interest dichotomy, this analysis seeks to understand autobiographic trajectories of Japanese and Korean environmental aid rather than to evaluate them.

This article examines the effect of development assistance programs on Local Agenda 21 (LA21) programs in three municipalities of Thailand. First, the article examines institutional changes in Thailand geared toward decentralization. Second, the article analyzes the effect based on the frameworks of Noda and Ouchi for the level of participation. The results indicate that participation was a top—down participation of local residents who presumed some benefits from the municipality in exchange for their attendance in meetings. Third, the article evaluates the effect in terms of project efficiency. The results show that municipalities conducted most of the actions declared in their LA21 but the sustainability of these actions is questionable. It is contended that LA21 has its limitations as a planning guide for sustainable cities in developing countries. An assistance program should be designed that helps the government of a developing country to institutionalize meaningful involvement for a participatory environmental policy formation.

China's interest in other countries' infrastructure has become a sensitive issue for governments and media, in particular in Western countries. In particular, Chinese companies are aggressively seeking entrance into the European market, and European countries may find Chinese companies to be the only serious bidders for expensive, low-profit and long-term infrastructure projects. Many countries have procedures for reviewing intentions of foreign investment in their critical infrastructure, defined as infrastructure that is closely related to issues of sovereignty and national security. This new DIIS Defence and Security Studies Policy Report provides an overview of how various countries have received Chinese interests in investing in their critical infrastructure, using the examples of the nuclear power and telecommunication industries. In the view of host country governments, Chinese investment in nuclear and telecommunications infrastructures may have consequences for nuclear security and safety and information security respectively. For nuclear power and uranium mining, the report reviews the latest Chinese investments (planned or realised) in the UK, Greenland, Pakistan, the Middle East and Ukraine. For telecommunications, the report analyses the wide range of responses from countries - the Scandinavian countries, US, UK and selected African countries. In a nutshell, host country attitudes and policies towards Chinese investment in telecommunications and nuclear power vary widely. Some countries reject Chinese investment in these areas because of distrust in Chinese companies based on their perceived connection to the Chinese government, and others have accepted them due to economic needs and diplomatic relations with Beijing, and put into place various review and monitoring mechanisms. Moreover, Chinese investors may not be more risky than those from other countries, including Western investors. Based on the empirical cases, the report discusses the implications for national and international security, and comes up with policy recommendations for Denmark.