Managing Sovereign Debt Restructurings in the Euro Zone. A Note on Old and Current Debates
In: Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 451, July 2018
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In: Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 451, July 2018
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 27, Heft 3, S. 471-484
In: European journal of political economy, Band 27, Heft 3, S. 471-484
ISSN: 1873-5703
Why do some States default on their debt more often than others? We argue that sovereign default is the outcome of a political struggle among different groups of citizens. It is less likely to happen if domestic debt-holders are politically strong and/or the costs of the financial turmoil typically triggered by a sovereign bankruptcy are large. We show that these conditions are in turn more likely to be present if a country has a strong middle class and/or a sufficiently independent central bank. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]
In: European journal of political economy, Band 79, S. 102415
ISSN: 1873-5703
In: Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No. 1360
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In: Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 691
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 59, S. 423-444
In: Bank of Italy Occasional Paper No. 398
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In: Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No. 1135
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In: Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No. 1151
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 1949
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 1664
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In: Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No. 938
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In: The Geneva papers on risk and insurance - issues and practice, Band 38, Heft 4, S. 777-802
ISSN: 1468-0440
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