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AbstractA prominent explanation of war claims that international conflict can result when shifts in bargaining power induce the declining power to behave aggressively today because the rising power cannot credibly commit to not behave aggressively tomorrow. This paper asks whether individuals respond to shifting power in ways assumed by these models. Rather than use abstract laboratory-based bargaining games as in other work, I use vignettes describing the United States in an international bargaining situation to explore the microfoundations of power transitions models empirically. The vignettes vary whether the individual is a member of a declining or a rising power and whether there are previous public commitments to the status quo division of territory. Subjects propose a response the United States should make and then explain their decision in their own words. I apply new methods for analyzing these open-ended responses. Consistent with predictions from the behavioral literature, I find important asymmetries in behavior across these conditions as well as substantial heterogeneities in individuals' motivations for their decisions. The results of the experiments suggest potential ways that power-transition models should be refined to have a firmer behavioral basis.

I study experimentally a single-shot trust game where players have the opportunity to choose an avatar-a computer-generated face-to represent them. These avatars vary on several dimensions-trustworthiness, dominance, and threat-identified by previous work as influencing perceptions of those who view the faces (Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008). I take this previous work and ask whether subjects choose faces that are ex ante more trustworthy, whether selected avatars have an influence on strategy choices, and whether individuals who evaluate faces as more trustworthy are also more likely to trust others. Results indicate affirmative answers to all three questions. Additional experimental sessions used randomly assigned avatars. This design allows me to compare behavior when everyone knows avatars are self-selected versus when everyone knows they are randomly assigned. Random assignment eliminated all three effects observed when subjects chose their avatars. Adapted from the source document.

English Political scientists have access to a number of competing methodologies that marshal different forms of evidence for their arguments about political phenomena. Recently a new form of evidence has appeared in political science research and, more frequently, economics: spatially explicit and time-varying neurological activity of human subjects engaged in political or economic decision-making. As with any of the more standard methodologies, this approach carries with it a set of orienting theories linking hypotheses with the types of data induced to support or falsify these theories. While this new form of evidence is exciting, especially for the empirically minded social scientist, it deserves the utmost scrutiny. I provide a review of how neurological imaging is being used in the social sciences and consider several problems and prospects of using neuroimaging data in political science. French Les sciences politiques ont recours à des méthodes de recherche et à des évidences empiriques diverses pour étudier les phénomènes politiques. Récemment, les chercheurs en sciences politiques et plus souvent encore en économie se sont tout particulièrement intéressés à l'activité cérébrale, objectivable dans l'espace et variant dans le temps, de sujets humains en situation de prise de décision politique ou économique. Comme toute autre méthode de recherche, cette approche s'appuie sur des orientations théoriques, qui font le lien entre les hypothèses de recherche et les données destinées à étayer ou invalider ces théories. Si cette approche nouvelle semble prometteuse, tout particulièrement pour les chercheurs à l'esprit empirique, elle mérite d'être examinée en profondeur. L'article fait le point sur l'utilisation des résultats de l'imagerie cérébrale fonctionnelle en sciences sociales et considère les différents problèmes qu'elle pose ainsi que les perspectives nouvelles qu'elle peut offrir en sciences politiques.

The use of surveys and survey experiments by international political economy scholars is increasing, adding to the ability to study a broad array of topics. In doing so, many scholars in international political economy draw on-and are contributing to-insights and arguments from American politics and comparative politics (Milner 1998), substantive fields with a history of using surveys and survey experiments. In this article, I review motivations for using surveys and survey experiments, the research designs, and analysis strategies in light of this issue's contributions. I contrast these motivations and their accompanying designs and discuss the pros and cons of ways to approach the data generated by these research designs. The goal of this commentary is to situate surveys and survey experiments-especially those within the special issue-within a larger discussion about research motivations, design, and analysis techniques.(International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

While most existing theoretical and experimental literatures focus on how a high probability of repeated play can lead to more socially efficient outcomes (for instance, using the result that cooperation is possible in a repeated prisoner's dilemma), this paper focuses on the detrimental effects of repeated play -- the "dark side of the future." I study a resource division model with repeated interaction and changes in bargaining strength. The model predicts a negative relationship between the likelihood of repeated interaction and social efficiency. This is because the longer shadow of the future exacerbates commitment problems created by changes in bargaining strength. I test and find support for the model using incentivized laboratory experiments. Increases in the likelihood of repeated play lead to more socially inefficient outcomes in the laboratory. Adapted from the source document.