Abstract The present article deals with different Marxist theories on the Soviet experience, which emerged in post-Soviet Russophone Marxist or neo-Marxist scholarship (concurrently with some reference to Marxist traditions in other former Eastern Bloc countries). The article demonstrates that these theories – if we leave the remaining 'Marxist-Leninists' of the classical Soviet type aside and focus on critical, post-Soviet Marxism – may be classified as either 'fundamentally rejectionist' or 'Thermidorian'. The former, in line with the seminal criticisms of K. Kautsky and other early opponents of Lenin, reject the socialist nature of the October 1917 Revolution outright. The latter mostly define the Revolution as at least socialist-oriented, but further bifurcate into different varieties of the 'state capitalism' thesis with a number of theorists defining Stalinist societies as special varieties of post-revolutionary industrialism essentially different from orthodox capitalism. Most critical post-Soviet Marxists agree, however, that the main vector of Soviet-type regimes' evolution indeed pointed towards increased class stratification. However, it should be remembered that Soviet-type bureaucracy was a class-in-the-making rather than a class-in-itself or a class-for-itself, and this point is further elaborated in the works of those theorists who prioritise the differences rather than similarities between Soviet-type industrialism and orthodox capitalism.
Some scholars have recently discussed the supposed failure of socialism in South Korea. By failure, they tend to refer to the low parliamentary representation of social-democratic parties in today's South Korea, as well as a high degree of working-class fragmentation. I argue here that the rhetoric of failure does not do justice to the entirety of socialist experience in post-division South Korea. It is undeniable, of course, that the degree of working-class self-representational capacity was greatly affected by both hard-core Cold War anti-communist policies and the neoliberal fragmentation of wage laborers into many divergent, sometimes even mutually antagonistic, groups. However, the noteworthy revival of autochthonous socialist politics and ideology in the 1980s, as well as socialist success in entering mainstream electoral politics in the 2000s, reveals the potential of political socialism in South Korea. Moreover, I argue that socialist/Marxist influence on South Korean intellectual paradigms and debates is significantly more pronounced than research suggests. Rather than a failure, socialism in South Korea represents a continuum of struggle. Socialism did not triumph on the Korean Peninsula in the twentieth century. However, the struggle continues, and constitutes perhaps the principally important part of Korea's modern and contemporary history
The present article is an attempt at a meta-historical analysis of the 'Red Age' (1923 to the late 1930s) experiences in colonial-period Korea. The article focuses on contextualizing the experiences of colonial-age Korea's Communist movement internationally and distinguishing these traits of this movement which are definable as universal. As this article argues, in the wider historical context the 'Red Age' Communist movements, the Korean one included, fought, in the end, for deeper democratization of the existing world- system on the social and cultural levels. These movements ―usually led by revolutionary intelligentsia and staffed on middle- and lower-cadre level by the cadres of working-class origins ―had the evolving Party-state in early Soviet Union as their model of the desirable future. They saw an overtake of the industrial economy by a revolutionary state as the 'transition to socialism,' hoping, on more practical levels, that revolutionary nationalizations and dirigiste economic policies would provide more space for underprivileged majority's social and cultural advancement. While the Party-state would eschew the orthodox parliamentarism, its workings were supposed to bring forth a more equitable society. Despite the gaps between the 'Red Age' Communist dreams and the realities of historical Party-states, the movement played an important role in laying the foundations for the postwar changes, in Korea and elsewhere.
Introduced to Korea around 1900, the modern idea of the ethno-nation (minjok) developed into one of the most important intellectual and political concepts circulating in the country by the early 1920s. From the nationalists' viewpoint, the ethno-nation, seen as an unchanging and homogenous entity, was the primary site for individuals' belonging. The national collectivity was a prerequisite for individuals' existence. While nationalists had been celebrating a primeval, immutable and rather ahistorical "Korean-ness" since the last precolonial decade (the 1900s), the Marxists—strongly influenced by Otto Bauer's and Joseph Stalin's understandings of nation as a product of capitalist modernity—started to question the nationalistic approach to Korean identity as a matter of principle by the late 1920s and early 1930s. There was no full agreement among them on how to understand the history of the Korean ethno-nation. Some of them believed that the Korean ethnic core dated back to the age of the Three Kingdoms (the first century BC to AD 668). Others put heavier emphasis on the role of proto-capitalism and markets in the modern development of national consciousness, tracing this development to the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries. This article summarizes these debates—between nationalists and Marxists, and also within the Marxist milieu—and links them to Marxist intellectual developments elsewhere. The author argues that the "proto-constructivist" approach articulated by some colonial-age Marxists was an important counterweight to the nationalist nativism of the 1920s and 1930s and, in the end, made a significant—and still largely unappreciated—contribution to the development of scholarship on Korea's history and culture. Keywords: ethno-nation, nationalism, communism, socialism, Comintern, Korea, Paek Nam'un, Hong Kimun
Introduced to Korea around 1900, the modern idea of the ethno-nation (minjok) developed into one of the most important intellectual and political concepts circulating in the country by the early 1920s. From the nationalists' viewpoint, the ethno-nation, seen as an unchanging and homogenous entity, was the primary site for individuals' belonging. The national collectivity was a prerequisite for individuals' existence. While nationalists had been celebrating a primeval, immutable and rather ahistorical "Korean-ness" since the last precolonial decade (the 1900s), the Marxists—strongly influenced by Otto Bauer's and Joseph Stalin's understandings of nation as a product of capitalist modernity—started to question the nationalistic approach to Korean identity as a matter of principle by the late 1920s and early 1930s. There was no full agreement among them on how to understand the history of the Korean ethno-nation. Some of them believed that the Korean ethnic core dated back to the age of the Three Kingdoms (the first century BC to AD 668). Others put heavier emphasis on the role of proto-capitalism and markets in the modern development of national consciousness, tracing this development to the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries. This article summarizes these debates—between nationalists and Marxists, and also within the Marxist milieu—and links them to Marxist intellectual developments elsewhere. The author argues that the "proto-constructivist" approach articulated by some colonial-age Marxists was an important counterweight to the nationalist nativism of the 1920s and 1930s and, in the end, made a significant—and still largely unappreciated—contribution to the development of scholarship on Korea's history and culture. ; Demystifying the Nation: The Communist Concept of Ethno-Nation in 1920s-1930s Korea
By the time of Korea's forced integration into the Japanese Empire in 1910, Social Darwinism was established as the main reference frame for the modernizing intellectual elite. The weak had only themselves to blame for their misfortune, and Korea, if it wished to succeed in collective survival in the modern world's Darwinist jungles, had to strengthen itself. This mode of thinking was inherited by the right-wing nationalists in the 1920s-1930s; their programs of "national reconstruction" (minjok kaejo) aimed at remaking weak Korea into a "fitter" nation, thus preparing for the eventual independence from the Japanese. At the same time, in the 1920s and 1930s some nationalists appropriated the slogan of solidarity and protection of the weak, nationally and internationally, in the course of their competition against the Left. After liberation from Japanese colonialism in 1945, "competition" mostly referred to inter-state competition in South Korean right-wing discourse. However, the neo-liberal age after the 1997 Asian financial crisis witnessed a new discursive shift, competition-driven society being now the core of the mainstream agenda. (Crit Asian Stud/GIGA)
This article deals with the noted Russian Narodnik revolutionary Nikolai Sudzilovsky-Russel (1850–1930), his views on China and Japan, and the background of those views in the Russian intellectual tradition. Russian revolutionaries tended to share many of the Eurocentric biases of their Westernizer (Zapadniki) mentors and often viewed Asia—East Asia included—as retrograde, Japan being seen as an exception. Russian Narodniks' positive view of Japan was not unrelated to their belief in the unilineal hierarchy of progress and civilization, in which Japan was seen as topping Russia. Sudzilovsky-Russel's views originally developed as a continuation of this paradigm. However, his observations of the contemporaneous Chinese revolutionary movement and personal exchanges with Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) showed him the revolutionary potential of China. In the end, he accepted the idea that a political revolution in China would provide an important impulse to the cause of social revolutions in the West. Concurrently, in the dialogue between Russian and Chinese revolutionaries, something akin to a general strategy for radical change on the world's agricultural periphery was taking shape, anticipating a number of later ideological and political developments in both China and Russia. Sudzilovsky-Russel viewed the tasks facing Russian and Chinese revolutionaries as essentially similar: while catching up with the supposedly advanced societies of the West, both were to bypass the "plutocratic" capitalist stage on their way to an emancipatory, alternative modern future. Keywords: Narodnik, Nikolai Sudzilovsky-Russel, Sun Yat-sen, socialism, revolution, catch-up modernization, China, Japan, Russia
AbstractThe paper deals with the trends of fascist and fascist-like right-wing social and political thought in colonial Korea in the early 1930s. It shows that in the 1920s, Korea's right wing, its ability to reach out to the masses being severely limited, preferred mostly conciliatory tactics in its relationship with leftist radicals, often making efforts towards inventing 'hybrid' ideologies which would integrate the leftist social concerns into the mainstream religious or nationalist constructions (an example of such a hybrid were various Korean versions of Christian socialism). After the Great Depression, however, Korea's nascent bourgeoisie felt more threatened and became more interested in keeping abreast with right-wing extremist trends in the mother country (Japan) and elsewhere. Such representative ideologists of the Korean propertied class as Yun Ch'iho and Yi Kwangsu were praising Mussolini and employing strong Social Darwinist language in their exhortations to the Korean people to 'regain their vitality and develop [a] spirit of collectivism, obedience and self-sacrifice'. However, until the very end of the 1930s many of Korea's right-wing ideologues remained pronouncedly religious (Yun as Christian, Yi as Buddhist). While highlighting the religious essentials of their worldviews they often abstained from imitating the most extremist traits of European fascist ideologies (for example, anti-Semitism). In many ways, Korea's fascism continued until the end of the 1930s to be an intellectual discourse rather than a mass movement, and retained a strong aura of belonging to more mainstream religious or nationalist traditions.