Suchergebnisse

Current international relations theory struggles to explain both the autonomy and transformation of international organizations (IOs). Previous theories either fail to account for any IO behavior that deviates from the interests of member states, or neglect the role of member states in reforming IO institutions and behavior. We propose an agency theory of IOs that can fill these gaps while also addressing two persistent problems in the study of IOs: common agency and long delegation chains. Our model explains slippage between member states' interests and IO behavior, but also suggests institutional mechanisms—staff selection, monitoring, procedural checks, and contracts—through which states can rein in errant IOs. We evaluate this argument by examining multiple institutional reforms and lending patterns at the World Bank from 1980 to 2000.

Die aktuelle Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen hat Schwierigkeiten, sowohl die Autonomie als auch die Transformation internationaler Organisationen (IO)zu erklären. Vorherige Theorien versagen entweder bei der Erklärung von Verhaltensweisen von IO, die von den Interessen der Mitgliedsstaaten abweichen, oder vernachlässigen die Rolle der Mitgliedsstaaten bei der Reform von IO-Institutionen und deren Verhalten. Der Artikel entwirft eine Agency-Theorie der IO, die diese Lücken füllen kann und ausserdem zwei andauernde Probleme des Studiums von IO löst: die sog. "common agency" und die "long delegation chains". Das Modell erklärt Differenzen zwischen den Interessen der Mitgliedsstaaten und dem Verhalten von IO, schlägt aber auch institutionelle Mechanismen wie z.B. die Auswahl der Angestellten, Überwachung, prozedurale Überprüfung und Verträge vor, durch die Staaten die Kontrolle über fehlgeleiteten IOen wiedergewinnen können. Dieses Argument wird durch die Untersuchung mehrerer institutioneller Reformen und Kreditvergabemustern der Weltbank von 1980 bis 2000 überprüft. (SWP-Jns)

ABSTRACTMany observers of the international relations (IR) discipline express concern about the decline in policy-relevant research within the academy. Some blame an academic culture and academic institutions that incentivize abstract, quantitative, or theoretical work that speaks to scholarly debates rather than real-world problems. This article asks how IR scholars value both scholarly and policy publications. Using data from the TRIP survey, we found that publications generally considered policy relevant are undervalued in academic tenure decisions. These findings hold regardless of whether faculty have attained tenure or whether they consider their own research to be policy relevant. However, scholars who consult, teach at colleges rather than research universities, or teach in Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs schools rather than political science departments are likely to believe: (1) that policy-relevant research products are currently valued more highly than their colleagues estimate; and (2) on the normative question, that these policy publications should be valued even more highly than they are. Overall, these results suggest an openness to increasing the value of policy-relevant research in tenure decisions as part of an effort to increase the amount of policy-focused work in the discipline.