Suchergebnisse

Reveals how the United States has struggled to adapt to the new era of guerrilla conflict, causing military losses and political disasters, and outlines a strategy of military engagement and diplomacy to help the nation withdraw from unsuccessful campaigns

Abstract
Leaders in international relations often exhibit fatalism, or the belief that events are guided by forces beyond their control. In some cases, fatalism may reflect reality, or be rhetoric to boost support. But there is also an important psychological explanation: fatalism can help leaders avoid responsibility for costly outcomes and protect their self-image. Fatalism is more likely: (1) in regard to bad outcomes versus good outcomes; (2) when war is seen as imminent versus far-off; and (3) in nondemocratic regimes versus democratic regimes. The concept of fatalism is central to philosophy, religion, medicine, sociology, and psychology, but has been neglected by scholars in international relations. Fatalism may be an important cause of war, especially when combined with a perceived window of opportunity. This research contributes to democratic peace theory by helping explain the lack of war between representative regimes. If elected leaders are less prone to extreme fatalism about war, democracies may have more room to maneuver in a crisis. I use case studies of the origins of World War I and World War II to probe the argument.

Abstract
The United States has declared an era of strategic competition with China but how might this rivalry end—assuming a positive outcome for US interests? US policy-makers have chosen not to pick a favoured end state for strategic competition, hoping to maintain flexibility. However, the decision not to choose a termination point could make the rivalry more difficult to resolve. The 'negativity bias' in psychology means that threats tend to loom large, limiting the odds of ending strategic competition. This article applies the negativity bias to potential end-state scenarios—China's accommodation of US interests, China's democratization and China's collapse—and shows that none of these scenarios will likely end strategic competition. A study of the resolution of US great power rivalries over the last two centuries suggests there is a high bar to end strategic competition. Washington should choose a favoured end-game for strategic competition and the best option is sustained Chinese reform or 'accommodation plus'. The negativity bias may powerfully influence the course and resolution of the Sino-US rivalry, and it can also help to explain many wider behaviours in international relations.