Suchergebnisse

This article analyzes the phenomenon of 'overkill', which usually accompanies human life as an example of non-constructive behavior. In this article, the author considers the 'overkill' phenomenon in the late Imperial and Soviet period in Russia, when overkill was de facto constituted and became one of the ways to manage society. The author proves that with the development of society, the government begins to need overkill as a means of effective management policy, which allows testing public opinion while achieving the goals set by the government. Taking on the task of implementing global and rapid violent changes, the government faces resistance from people. The author shows that overkill transitions from a household phenomenon to the one used by the state, gains a special quality. The overkill that occurs when the message of power is conveyed to the population is the simplest and most effective way to compensate for the lack of feedback mechanisms between the government and society. This phenomenon has proven necessary for the authoritarian and especially totalitarian authorities – they use it to legitimize themselves, explain mistakes, and declare people guilty. In the Communist system, overkill played an important role as a stimulator and regulator in political, socio-economic, and cultural life. Mobilization campaigns, so popular in the USSR, used this 'overkill' method as a prerequisite for success. Thus, 'overkill' has become an important and integral way of interaction between a dictatorial state and society.

The article analyzes the emergence of the so-called red funeral ritual in the 1920s in Soviet Russia as an important component of political everyday life. The first part of the article examines the funeral rituals of representatives of the Bolshevik elite. The second part attempts to characterize the transformation of funeral rites among the "common" population. The analysis undertaken clearly shows the undoubted political and public nature of funeral rituals in early Soviet Russia. Initially, Soviet funeral rituals were powerfully influenced by radical utilitarianism and total nihilistic denial of the religious worldview, intensified by the excesses of the World War, Revolution and Civil War. Nevertheless, nihilism and utilitarianism, the highest expression of which was the idea of cremation, were quickly pushed out by a new funeral ritual, the key elements of which were demonstration and "theatrical ritual" with its music, processions, pretentious speeches and fireworks, in many respects borrowed from military funerals. The main role in the emergence of the red funeral ritual was played by the cult of fallen heroes, which in turn was a guarantee of political immortality of the Bolshevik leaders. As a result, the red funeral became an important element of the alternative Bolshevik culture. The concept of Vladimir Buldakov, who characterized revolutionary funeral rituals as "neo-pagan", is at least controversial. The attempt to make funerals of the Bolshevik elites a model for mass funerals collided with conservative rituals, especially in the countryside. With regard to the 1920s, at best, we can talk about the emergence of a kind of "the effect of dual faith", a specific symbiosis of red and religious funeral rites. Thus, in the 1920s, the process of a new Soviet ritualism development was far from complete, including the Soviet party and state elites, as evidenced by the fluctuations between party asceticism with its utilitarian attitude to ashes and splendid funerals of leaders.