Suchergebnisse

Electronic voting and counting are increasingly common and have been adopted in a number of Australian jurisdictions. Unfortunately, there is evidence that e-voting systems lack transparency. At present there are reasonable solutions for poll-site e-voting but none for remote paperless Internet voting. Although there are reasonable methods for statistical audits of electronically counted election results, Australian elections do not use them. The authors argue that a purposive approach should be taken to relevant electoral laws to ensure that genuine scrutiny of electronic electoral processes can be undertaken. This would require the source code and the voting data to be made available for testing. The authors recommend a number of legislative reforms to ensure the verifiability of e-voting. These reforms need to be undertaken to ensure that Australian elections are accurate, and consistent with the constitutional requirement of direct choice by electors.

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed conference proceedings of the 4th International Conference on E-Voting and Identity, VoteID 2013, held in Guildford, UK, during July 17-19, 2013. The 12 revised full papers presented were carefully selected from 26 submissions. The papers include a range of works on end-to-end verifiable election systems, verifiably correct complex tallying algorithms, human perceptions of verifiability, formal models of verifiability and, of course, attacks on systems formerly advertised as verifiable

This pamphlet describes end-to-end election verifiability (E2E-V) for a nontechnical audience: election officials, public policymakers, and anyone else interested in secure, transparent, evidence - based electronic elections. This work is part of the Overseas Vote Foundation's End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting: Specification and Feasibility Assessment Study (E2E VIV Project), funded by the Democracy Fund.

This pamphlet describes end-to-end election verifiability (E2E-V) for a nontechnical audience: election officials, public policymakers, and anyone else interested in secure, transparent, evidence-based electronic elections. This work is part of the Overseas Vote Foundation's End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting: Specification and Feasibility Assessment Study (E2E VIV Project), funded by the Democracy Fund.

The Scytl/SwissPost e-voting solution was intended to provide complete verifiability for Swiss government elections. We show failures in both individual verifiability and universal verifiability (as defined in Swiss Federal Ordinance 161.116), based on mistaken implementations of cryptographic components. These failures allow for the construction of "proofs" of an accurate election outcome that pass verification though the votes have been manipulated. Using sophisticated cryptographic protocols without a proper consideration of what properties they offer, and under which conditions, can introduce opportunities for undetectable fraud even though the system appears to allow verification of the outcome. Our findings are immediately relevant to systems in use in Switzerland and Australia, and probably also elsewhere.

The Scytl/SwissPost e-voting solution was intended to provide complete verifiability for Swiss government elections. We show failures in both individual verifiability and universal verifiability (as defined in Swiss Federal Ordinance 161.116), based on mistaken implementations of cryptographic components. These failures allow for the construction of "proofs" of an accurate election outcome that pass verification though the votes have been manipulated. Using sophisticated cryptographic protocols without a proper consideration of what properties they offer, and under which conditions, can introduce opportunities for undetectable fraud even though the system appears to allow verification of the outcome. Our findings are immediately relevant to systems in use in Switzerland and Australia, and probably also elsewhere.