Suchergebnisse

Set in the aftermath of China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), this book questions the extent to which the liberal internationalist promise of membership has been fulfilled in China. The book unpacks the policies that various Chinese government actors adopted in response to WTO rules and shows that rather than disciplining the state, WTO entry provoked a divergence of policy responses across different parts of the complex party-state.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction: Integrating China into the Liberal International Order -- 1. China's WTO Challenge -- 2. A Theory of State Strategies under Global Rules -- 3. The Hierarchical Politics of WTO Entry -- 4. Explaining the Rise of State Capitalism -- 5. FDI and the Quest for National Champions -- Conclusion: Reassessing China in the WTO Era -- A. Appendix to Chapter 3 -- B. Appendix to Chapter 4 -- List of Interviews -- Notes -- References -- Index

This article examines the impact of transparency regulations enacted under authoritarian conditions, through a study of China's environmental transparency measures. Given China's decentralized administrative structure, environmental disclosure ends up being weakest in the most polluted cities. However, the measures have allowed nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to affect environmental governance through unusual pathways. Multinational companies (MNCs) have used NGO pollution databases to monitor Chinese suppliers, whereas local governments have responded to a transparency index with greater NGO engagement. That said, these civil society initiatives have had limited impact on key stakeholder behavior. For the environment ministry, enforcement costs remain high. Local government behavior depends on their economic priorities and the nature of their relations with enterprises. Chinese enterprise behavior depends on the character of their relations with government and MNCs. Given China's authoritarian structure, improved governance does not translate into stronger accountability, challenging common assumptions about the relationship between transparency and accountability. Adapted from the source document.

This article examines the impact of transparency regulations enacted under authoritarian conditions, through a study of China's environmental transparency measures. Given China's decentralized administrative structure, environmental disclosure ends up being weakest in the most polluted cities. However, the measures have allowed nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to affect environmental governance through unusual pathways. Multinational companies (MNCs) have used NGO pollution databases to monitor Chinese suppliers, whereas local governments have responded to a transparency index with greater NGO engagement. That said, these civil society initiatives have had limited impact on key stakeholder behavior. For the environment ministry, enforcement costs remain high. Local government behavior depends on their economic priorities and the nature of their relations with enterprises. Chinese enterprise behavior depends on the character of their relations with government and MNCs. Given China's authoritarian structure, improved governance does not translate into stronger accountability, challenging common assumptions about the relationship between transparency and accountability.

In a Xi Jinping era of rising central power and policy activism, what role is left for Chinese provinces? This article argues that, notwithstanding centralizing tendencies, China's recent economic development trajectory cannot be understood without taking into account the distinctive policy roles and priorities of provincial governments. Successive waves of governance restructuring have in many ways strengthened rather than weakened provincial authorities, reinforcing their role as central-local gatekeepers within China's political economy. In particular, we draw attention to the ways that provinces create and shape "development space" (fazhan kongjian 发展空间) for different industries and localities and alter the contours of China's international economic engagement. We explore how provinces use their position as brokers of development space to concentrate investment in privileged areas of the economy while neglecting other aspects of development, deviating from central priorities in the process. Using case studies about industrial policy, rural development, and foreign economic relations, we show how—even in an era of centralism—provinces' developmental drive remains untamed. (China J/GIGA)

Abstract
Does state ownership limit the liberalizing effects of the WTO? We examine the case of China, which is not only the largest exporting state but also lends active support to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that could distort global trade. Using data on import purchases disaggregated by ownership from 1993 to 2012, we analyze how WTO entry affects the commercial orientation of state-owned and private imports. We demonstrate that after WTO entry, tariff cuts have a larger effect on private compared to SOE trade. We then show that state ownership alone does not block the WTO's liberalizing effects. For most industries, SOEs and private firms are alike in their commercial orientation. However, where strategic goods targeted by industrial policy hold a large share of bilateral trade, lowering tariffs has no impact on SOE trade. These findings highlight the tensions between state-led economic models and global trade law premised upon market principles.

pt. 1. Asian countries as global health donors -- pt. 2. Asian contributions to collective action instruments to address global health challenges -- pt. 3. Asian participation in governing global health research and knowledge products -- pt. 4. Cross-cutting perspectives on Asia and global health governance.