The thirty years crisis -- Ecomodernism and its critics -- Assessing the technological challenge -- The politics of low-carbon innovation -- Human flourishing amid climate harms -- Global social democracy and geoengineering justice.
Cover -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- Restraint or Innovation? -- Outline of the Argument -- Innovation and Ecomodernism -- Rethinking Social Democracy for the Anthropocene -- 1: The Thirty Years' Crisis -- A Temperature Check -- The Thirty Years' Crisis: the Era of Knowing Climate Inaction -- An Era of Human Flourishing -- The Failure of Environmental Politics -- Conclusion -- 2: Ecomodernism and its Critics -- Defining Ecomodernism -- Progressive Environmental Prometheans … an Unfamiliar Constellation -- The prohibition on intervention in complex systems -- Harmonizing with Nature -- Conclusion -- 3: Assessing the Technological Challenge -- Alternative Visions -- Sources of greenhouse gas emissions and the need for technological innovation -- The need for technological innovation -- Electricity and innovation -- Is a tiny elite to blame? -- Degrowth and unequal consumption -- Assessing the cost of ambitious mitigation -- Why warming of 2°C is now all but inevitable -- Conclusion -- 4: The Politics of Low-Carbon Innovation -- Mariana Mazzucato, Fred Block and 'Mission-Oriented' Innovation -- Neoliberal and Populist Progressive Opposition -- How Should the Climate Movement Think about Technology and the State? -- What Determines National Innovation Rates? -- Conclusion -- 5: Human Flourishing amid Climate Harms -- 'Third Worldism' and the 'New International Economic Order' -- Conditionality -- Contemporary Conditionality - Biotechnology and Energy -- Genetically modified food -- Energy -- Conditionality and state-led development -- Conclusion -- 6: Global Social Democracy and Geoengineering Justice -- Solar Geoengineering, Risk and Relative Vulnerability -- Towards Global Social Democracy -- Conclusion -- Conclusion -- Ecomodernism, Innovation and Heresy.
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
What is a Classical Realist analysis of climate ethics and politics? Classical Realist ethical analysis differs from ideal normative theory in that it addresses state decision-makers rather than individuals, assumes highly imperfect compliance with the demands of justice, and is concerned with feasibility and transition rather than end-states. Classical Realists urge leaders to prioritise state security over private moral concerns, to assess rival policies against their likely consequences and to seek the 'lesser evil' among feasible choices. But how does Realism respond when the prudent pursuit of state security risks rendering much of the planet uninhabitable? In the 1950s, the development of the hydrogen bomb created just such a dilemma as status quo politics now carried a significant risk of thermonuclear omnicide. In response, Hans Morgenthau argued that states should manage systemic risk by working in concert to safeguard expanded, collective national interests. The Classical Realist mode of thought suggests an analogous response to systemic climate risks: states' conceptions of national interest must expand to include cooperative system-preservation alongside traditional security concerns. Classical Realist arguments might then be mobilised to overcome resistance from vested interests and to support state-directed low carbon innovation, adaptation and mitigation agreements that prioritise ambition over distributional justice.
AbstractWhat is a Classical Realist analysis of climate ethics and politics? Classical Realist ethical analysis differs from ideal normative theory in that it addresses state decision-makers rather than individuals, assumes highly imperfect compliance with the demands of justice, and is concerned with feasibility and transition rather than end-states. Classical Realists urge leaders to prioritise state security over private moral concerns, to assess rival policies against their likely consequences and to seek the 'lesser evil' among feasible choices. But how does Realism respond when the prudent pursuit of state security risks rendering much of the planet uninhabitable? In the 1950s, the development of the hydrogen bomb created just such a dilemma as status quo politics now carried a significant risk of thermonuclear omnicide. In response, Hans Morgenthau argued that states should manage systemic risk by working in concert to safeguard expanded, collective national interests. The Classical Realist mode of thought suggests an analogous response to systemic climate risks: states' conceptions of national interest must expand to include cooperative system-preservation alongside traditional security concerns. Classical Realist arguments might then be mobilised to overcome resistance from vested interests and to support state-directed low carbon innovation, adaptation and mitigation agreements that prioritise ambition over distributional justice.
Abstract'Legitimacy' is commonly cited as one of three fundamental mechanisms of social control within both domestic politics and international society. However, despite growing attention to the legitimacy of global governance, little consideration has been given to the identity of the political communities that must grant legitimacy to an international organisation or to the conditions under which legitimacy is valuable for the functioning of that organisation. In raising and responding to these questions, this article rejects the argument that actors must gain legitimacy among all subject social constituencies within their political realm of action. Instead, the importance of legitimacy within a particular constituency is a variable. The article labels this variable a 'legitimacy nexus' and outlines five factors that are hypothesised to contribute to calibrating a legitimacy nexus. The plausibility of the proposed schema is explored through discussion of the role of legitimacy in the trade regime and analysis of the origins of the International Labour Organization's anomalous tripartite representative structure.
Setting the agenda -- The emergence of a global movement -- Queer rights as human rights -- The conservative backlash -- International polarization -- What is to be done?
Climate change is one of the defining challenges of our times andits implications for energy security are profound. Climate concerns, declining reserves of easily accessible oil and gas, and the rise of new energy consumers will drive transformative changes to global energy systems. While these issues prompt widespread economic, environmental, and security fears, they are also connected to positive changes that include democratization of access to modern energy in the developing world. Viewed on a global scale, the primary challenge is to manage the legitimate energy demands of 6.9 billion people within the context of ecological limits. In the light of these trends, the authors examine how the concept of energy security is, will, and ideally should be transformed in the light of scientific evidence that combustion of fossil fuels contributes to dangerous climatic change.
AbstractPolicy instruments promoting sustainability, such as investment taxonomies, are playing an increasing role in guiding the allocation of financial resources internationally. But can policy instruments define sustainability in ways that are both operational (i.e. assessable via replicable procedures) and which specify practices that can reliably be expected to enhance future generations' welfare? This paper analyses candidate definitions of sustainability and identifies a dilemma: while various definitions identify a 'capital' variable whose value can indeed be determined empirically; we have no reason to assume that preservation of any specific capital variable will maximise expected future welfare. By contrast, sustainability can be defined 'dynamically' in terms of activities that will, on expectation, lead to future developmental trajectories with high welfare. But, as we show through discussion of concrete examples, 'dynamic sustainability' cannot readily be operationalised. We conclude that what qualifies as 'sustainable' will remain a subject of political dispute and that authoritative comprehensive assessments of 'sustainability' will remain chimeric. We suggest that selecting a narrow class of specific measures, such as of life‐cycle greenhouse gas emissions, might lead to more effective and less contentious approaches to resource allocation.
Global energy justice remains far out of reach. If the goal of energy justice is the universal, equitable, and democratic provision of safe, affordable, and sustainable energy services, the international community currently lacks the physical, ideational, or governance infrastructure necessary for its realization. Instead, access to energy remains radically unequal, continuing greenhouse gas emissions are creating intergenerational sabotage, and fossil fuel revenues routinely corrupt democratic politics. In addition to distributive injustice, global energy governance also creates dilemmas of procedure and recognition that are our focus. Here, we first identify inherent tensions between local democratic sovereignty and global energy justice and then argue that existing energy governance infrastructures often amplify powerful actors' leverage over the energy choices and strategies of less powerful communities. We conclude by discussing the design of a governance infrastructure that could promote climate mitigation and energy access goals without exploiting international inequalities in ways that risk undermining justice.