Certifying Second Chances
Policymakers around the country are grappling with how to provide a second chance to people with criminal records. These records create collateral consequences-invisible punishments that inhibit opportunity in all facets of a person's life. Over the past seven years, states have repeatedly tried to legislate new paths for people trying to move on with their lives. State legislators passed more than 150 laws targeting collateral consequences in 2019 alone. But what happens when these paths to second chances are littered with learning, compliance, and psychological costs? The people who most need these new opportunities may find that they are out of reach. A major problem, I argue, is the administrative burdens involved in accessing these remedies. Because of these hurdles, people with fewer resources-the population that would most benefit from the help-are the ones most likely to find these second chances out of reach. The Article closely examines one increasingly popular type of second-chance program: certificate laws that remove employment barriers. Building on recent research identifying the low usage rates of petition-based second-chance programs, this Article catalogs and analyzes the costs and burdens placed on people attempting to access employment certificates. Of particular concern is not only these low usage rates themselves, but also the identity of those least likely to access these interventions. Second-chance programs like employment certificates that provide a way forward for people with greater resources while leaving behind those without may be more harmful than helpful when placed in the larger context of mass criminalization and social change, even if they help the small number of individuals who do access them. In contrast, a well-designed second-chance initiative that appropriately considers administrative burdens and the way that interventions like employment certificates fit into the broader picture of social change could provide short-term benefits to people with criminal records while ...
