Suchergebnisse

We introduce a new data set on the strategies and tactics employed by belligerents in 197 internal armed conflicts that occurred between 1945 and 2013. The Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict (STAC) data set provides scholars with a rich new source of information to facilitate investigations of how regimes and their foreign supporters have responded to insurgent threats and the effects of actors' force employment choices on a wide variety of intra- and postconflict outcomes. In addition to seventeen novel variables that measure the strategies and tactics employed by governments and intervening states, the STAC data set contains independently coded measures of many variables that overlap with existing data sets—a feature that facilitates the replication of existing studies and robustness checks on the results of new studies. We demonstrate the utility of the STAC data with an analysis of the impact of rebel mobilization on the basis of ethnicity on the propensity of governments to employ forced resettlement, civilian protection, civilian welfare projects, and civilian targeting to counter the insurgent threat.

Drawing on arguments about the domestic political costs of using force & the ability of states to signal resolve, we develop a selection effects-based model of militarized interstate dispute outcomes. By disaggregating dispute outcomes to capture important theoretical distinctions among different types of "peaceful" resolutions to militarized disputes, we are able to generate new hypotheses about the effects of regime type on conflict escalation. Employing a multinomial logit analysis on disputes since 1816, we find that democracy has both monadic & dyadic effects on dispute escalation & that the effect of regime type varies with a state's role in a dispute. Disputes with democratic initiators are less likely to escalate to violence because democratic initiators are more likely than nondemocratic initiators to obtain target concessions without employing force. Democratic targets, on the other hand, select themselves out of disputes by making concessions at a higher rate than nondemocracies, unless the dispute initiator demands a change in the target's governance or the territorial status quo. Both patterns provide evidence that democracies are more selective about the disputes they escalate to violence, rather than more pacific overall. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractSocieties emerging from internal armed conflicts display surprising variation in the degree to which governments protect human rights. Employing new data on civilian victimization by both government and rebel forces, we find that the human rights climate of a post-conflict country is not simply a perpetuation of pre-conflict conditions, or the result of repressive regimes remaining in power. Instead, the treatment of civilians during conflict has an independent impact on post-conflict human rights protections (HRP). Analyses of ninety-six post-conflict periods (1960–2015) show that when governments systematically and extensively target civilians during counterinsurgency campaigns, post-conflict human rights conditions decline substantially compared to pre-conflict levels, even accounting for other predictors of human rights violations, including pre-conflict human rights conditions. This holds regardless of who is in power after conflicts end. These findings have implications for theoretical models of repression and conflict cycles, and for practitioners and policymakers aiming to restore and protect human rights after war.