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AbstractWhen agents first invest in financial markets, they are relatively inexperienced. The agents best positioned to educate the inexperienced stand to earn trading profits at the expense of inexperienced agents. Owing to this phenomenon, we show that the equilibrium amount of financial education does not fully correct the biases of the inexperienced agents. In a dynamic setting, large levels of uninformed trading volume may be generated by the inexperienced agents. This is because, in equilibrium, the experienced intermediaries may delay educating the inexperienced in order to earn commissions in earlier rounds of trade.

AbstractWe build a model where trading allows inexperienced agents to discern useful information sources. Upon losing money by trading on invalid information sources, investors learn from their experience and switch to alternative sources. Such activity leads to initial expected losses but later profitable trades. Trading activity is found to be increasing in the mass of such agents. Volume is greatest in firms with uncertain cash flows. Further, a greater number of information sources implies greater volume. This is consistent with the explosive growth in volume accompanying the growth of the internet, which presumably increases the number of heterogeneous information sources.

AbstractIn this paper, we investigate strategic informed trading in a regime with rule‐based market closures. Closure rules can be designed to reduce the ex ante trading costs of liquidity traders but cause informed traders to scale back their trading in order to reduce the chance of the closure being triggered. In the Stackelberg equilibrium where the informed act as leaders and market makers as followers, this phenomenon causes trading costs for small investors to increase. Thus, ex ante strategic behavior by informed traders in response to closure rules can result in increased trading costs for precisely the individuals whom the closures are intended to benefit: namely, the uninformed retail investors who trade small orders. We show, however, that this effect can be mitigated by randomizing the halting rule and thus reducing the degree of predictability of the halt from the perspective of informed traders.

AbstractWe consider asset prices and informational efficiency in a setting where owning stock confers direct utility due to an affect heuristic. Specifically, holding equity in brand name companies or those indulging in "socially desirable" activities (e.g., environmental consciousness) confers positive consumption benefits, whereas investing in "sin stocks" yields the reverse. In contrast to settings based on wealth considerations alone, expected stock prices deviate from expected fundamentals even when assets are in zero net supply. Stocks that yield high direct utility are, on average, more informationally efficient as they stimulate more entry into the market for these stocks and, consequently, more information collection. The analysis also accords with a value effect, high valuations of brand‐name stocks, abnormally positive returns on "sin stocks," volume premia in the cross‐section of returns, proliferation of mutual funds and ETFs, and yields untested implications. If, as psychological literature suggests, agents derive greater utility from successful companies by "basking in reflected glory," then asset prices react to public signals non‐linearly, leading to booms and busts, as well as crashes and recoveries.

AbstractThis paper analyzes firms' optimal choice of information disclosure before an acquisition. The intuition is that value‐maximizing firms face the following tradeoffs. First, a more precise disclosure reduces risk premia. Second, too precise a disclosure that allows targets to profit increases the price paid for the target in an acquisition. The main conclusion is that firm chooses to disclose either all information or the minimum information required by the regulators, depending on the disclosure requirements, investors' risk aversion, and the uncertainty embedded in technology shocks.