Suchergebnisse

Nowadays, it is widely believed that greater disclosure and clarity over policy may lead to greater predictability of central bank actions. We examine whether communication by the European Central Bank (ECB) adds information compared to the information provided by a Taylor rule model in which real time expected inflation and output are used. We use five indicators of ECB communication that are all based on the ECB President's introductory statement at the press conference following an ECB policy meeting. Our results suggest that even though the indicators are sometimes quite different from one another, they add information that helps predict the next policy decision of the ECB. Furthermore, also when the interbank rate is included in our Taylor rule model, the ECB communication indicators remain significant.

Abstract In a great majority of countries throughout the world productive government services have declined as percentage of GDP since the 1970s. In the macroeconomic literature this is often associated with the general productivity growth decline, suggesting an important role for infrastructure investment in economic growth. However, this also raises the question as of why public capital spending declined in so many countries. Surprisingly, hardly any research on this exists. This paper is one of the first attempts to fill this gap by testing various hypotheses that may explain the development of government capital spending using panel data for 123 non-OECD countries for the period 1970{1998. Politico-institutional variables, like ideology, political cohesion, political stability and political business cycles do not seem to be important when explaining government capital formation in less-developed economies. On the other hand, variables like public decits, private investment and foreign aid are significantly related to public capital spending.

Zsfassung in niederländ. Sprache

This paper analyses revisions of Swiss current account data, taking into account the actual data revision process and the implied types of revisions. In addition we investigate whether the first release of current account data can be improved upon by the use of survey results as gathered by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. An answer in the affirmative indicates that it is possible to improve first releases and thereby enhance the current assessment of the Swiss economy.

AbstractThe relationship between corruption and income inequality has been widely studied, but there is no consensus on whether corruption increases or reduces inequality. We conduct an extreme bounds analysis (EBA) to test the robustness of the explanatory variables proposed in the literature. Using a sample of up to 150 countries, with data mostly going back to 1980, we find that corruption does not appear to have a clear positive effect on inequality or may even reduce it. Also, contrary to what is sometimes suggested in the literature, the results do not support an inverted U‐shaped effect of corruption on income distribution. A more important role in explaining income distribution seems to be played by the level of financial development, the old‐age dependency ratio, the unemployment rate, the capital stock to GDP ratio and the population growth rate. These are often found to be significant drivers of inequality, regardless of the set of control variables and the definition of corruption used.

The political budget cycle (PBC) literature argues that governments expand deficits in election years. However, what happens when an economic downturn is expected? Will the government allow the deficit to expand even further, or will it resort to spending cuts and tax increases? When voters expect less than full automatic stabilization, our model shows that opportunistic government behavior leads to smaller deficits, thereby responding procyclically to expected downturns. Panel data evidence for 74 democracies covering the period 2000-2016 robustly supports the theoretical procyclicality prediction. Moreover, expected downturns remain significant when other context-conditional PBC effects are included in the empirical analysis. ; ISSN:1559-744X ; ISSN:1559-7431

AbstractThe political budget cycle (PBC) literature argues that governments expand deficits in election years. However, what happens when an economic downturn is expected? Will the government allow the deficit to expand even further, or will it resort to spending cuts and tax increases? When voters expect less than full automatic stabilization, our model shows that opportunistic government behavior leads to smaller deficits, thereby responding procyclically to expected downturns. Panel data evidence for 74 democracies covering the period 2000-2016 robustly supports the theoretical procyclicality prediction. Moreover, expected downturns remain significant when other context-conditional PBC effects are included in the empirical analysis.

The political budget cycle (PBC) literature argues that governments expand deficits in election years. However, what happens when an economic downturn is expected? Will the government allow the deficit to expand even further, or will it resort to spending cuts and tax increases? When voters expect less than full automatic stabilization, our model shows that opportunistic government behavior leads to smaller deficits, thereby responding procyclically to expected downturns. Panel data evidence for 74 democracies covering the period 2000-2016 robustly supports the theoretical procyclicality prediction. Moreover, expected downturns remain significant when other context-conditional PBC effects are included in the empirical analysis.

The political budget cycle (PBC) literature argues that governments expand deficits in election years. However, what happens when an economic downturn is expected? Will the government allow the deficit to expand even further, or will it resort to spending cuts and tax increases? When voters expect less than full automatic stabilization, our model shows that opportunistic government behavior leads to smaller deficits, thereby responding procyclically to expected downturns. Panel data evidence for 74 democracies covering the period 2000-2016 robustly supports the theoretical procyclicality prediction. Moreover, expected downturns remain significant when other context-conditional PBC effects are included in the empirical analysis.