Suchergebnisse

The agony and excitement of the 2004 Presidential campaign between Bush and Kerry echoed the mad frenzy of earlier, "low-tech" campaigns. In important ways, little has really changed in the fundamental nature of presidential campaigns, presidential politi

I study agricultural trade policy in a small open economy in which farmers and nonfarmers have given political clout and both groups have concave utility. When would prices fluctuate, political equilibrium is for government to stabilize domestic prices. Equilibrium trade policy also protects agents against changes in farm and nonfarm output. In world equilibrium, trade wars occur endogenously. The analysis helps understand historical and current agricultural trade policy. There is evidence, for instance, that policy has stabilized agricultural prices since the late Middle Ages. the analysis also suggests that English corn laws from 1463-1815 could have been Pareto-improving. ; Published in connection with a visit at the IIES.

The huge crowds for Obama and the disappointing turn-outs for other candidates and the agony and excitement of the 2004 Presidential campaign between Bush and Kerry echo the mad frenzy of earlier, low-tech campaigns. How much does it depend on the competing candidates, and how much the campaign staff? In important ways, little has really changed in the fundamental nature of presidential campaigns, presidential politics and presidential lives. In these pages, a Nixon man shares incidents and anecdotes that illuminate the inner workings of a presidential campaign and life in the White House, revealing touching moments and flashes of personality from the controversial Nixon years. He gives a sense of the adrenaline, the quick thinking and the humor that are part of the terrain when working for a campaign. These are small items, some serious, some humorous -- telling little moments not likely to be addressed in the writings of more famous authors. This is a collection of the stories that contribute to the drama of a campaign, of views from Pennsylvania Avenue, and with them some opinions on several White House personalities.

We derive median-voter results and study the shape of redistributional taxes when voters elect a candidate who imposes taxes to maximize own utility. Under general conditions, a median-productivity candidate is a Condorcet winner. The imposed tax function is nonlinear, may place high marginal rates on very low incomes, and may have an interval of negative marginal rates below the income of the winning candidate. Marginal rates are positive throughout, however, if non-redistributional spending or altruism toward the poor are great enough.

It is known that when people generate externalities, a birth also generates an externality and efficiency requires a Pigou tax/subsidy on having children. The size of the externality from a birth is important for studying policy. We calculate the size of this "population externality" in a specific case: we consider a maintained hypothesis that greenhouse gas emissions are a serious problem and assume government reacts by optimally restricting emissions. Calculated population externalities are large under many assumptions.

We derive median-voter results and study the shape of redistributional taxes when voters elect a candidate who imposes taxes to maximize own utility. Under general conditions, a median-productivity candidate is a Condorcet winner. The imposed tax function is nonlinear, may place high marginal rates on very low incomes, and may have an interval of negative marginal rates below the income of the winning candidate. Marginal rates are positive throughout, however, if non-redistributional spending or altruism toward the poor are great enough.

Transfers, spending, & tax revenue peaked as percentages of the gross national product (GNP) in most OECD countries during 1972-1992. The evidence suggests that a number of countries pushed transfers close to or perhaps beyond sustainable limits imposed by the Laffer curve. Namely: (i) stylized calculations of Laffer limits suggest peak fiscal sizes in the range of observed peaks in the countries with the greatest peak sizes; & (ii) the countries with the greatest peak sizes had the greatest declines in fiscal sizes from peaks until 1992. 5 Tables, 2 Appendixes, 33 References. Adapted from the source document.