Cet ouvrage offre un tour d'horizon des questions relatives à la neutralité et à l'ouverture d'internet: liberté d'information, non-discrimination dans l'accès à internet, problèmes de concurrence et de régulation dans une perspective comparative
In May 2015 the European Commission defined a "Strategy" for the Digital Single Market. This paper sketches an initial analysis of the "Strategy" 's main priorities for copyright, tackling the role and influence of the large distribution platforms. The paper highlights the territorial nature of intellectual property rights as a tool for market organisation (and a means of awarding royalties), something the supporters of its cultural field tend to forget when they stress the importance of cultural or social regulation. It also indicates what the Commission reasserts (there being no European copyright) making - or failing to make - choices about cross-border transferability, private copying, user-generated content (no via YouTube but yes to data mining, which had previously been regulated by the "Licences for Europe" initiative), etc. The final part addresses what is not treated in the "Strategy": the culturally prescriptive role of search engines or algorithms «that turn search engines into giants and content producers into dwarves».
In May 2015 the European Commission defined a "Strategy" for the Digital Single Market. This paper sketches an initial analysis of the "Strategy" 's main priorities for copyright, tackling the role and influence of the large distribution platforms. The paper highlights the territorial nature of intellectual property rights as a tool for market organisation (and a means of awarding royalties), something the supporters of its cultural field tend to forget when they stress the importance of cultural or social regulation. It also indicates what the Commission reasserts (there being no European copyright) making - or failing to make - choices about cross-border transferability, private copying, user-generated content (no via YouTube but yes to data mining, which had previously been regulated by the "Licences for Europe" initiative), etc. The final part addresses what is not treated in the "Strategy": the culturally prescriptive role of search engines or algorithms «that turn search engines into giants and content producers into dwarves».
In May 2015 the European Commission defined a "Strategy" for the Digital Single Market. This paper sketches an initial analysis of the "Strategy" 's main priorities for copyright, tackling the role and influence of the large distribution platforms. The paper highlights the territorial nature of intellectual property rights as a tool for market organisation (and a means of awarding royalties), something the supporters of its cultural field tend to forget when they stress the importance of cultural or social regulation. It also indicates what the Commission reasserts (there being no European copyright) making - or failing to make - choices about cross-border transferability, private copying, user-generated content (no via YouTube but yes to data mining, which had previously been regulated by the "Licences for Europe" initiative), etc. The final part addresses what is not treated in the "Strategy": the culturally prescriptive role of search engines or algorithms «that turn search engines into giants and content producers into dwarves».
Thank you for the invitation. It is a pleasure for me to speak on the topic of extended collective licenses ("ECL"), a model for managing copyright which is typical for Scandinavian countries. Although my Danish is a bit rusty—not to speak of my Swedish—I come from Belgium, a country which is neither a Nordic nor a Southern European country, but which at least has a strong experience with collective bargaining. It is difficult to understand the model of ECLs without the background of collective bargaining (in a country like the United States, private agreements rather than collective bargaining do play a prominent role). Belgian culture in the field of industrial relations is one in which labor issues are solved with collective agreements; this is possible because of the existence of very strong organizations representing employers and employees and the possibility for the collective agreements concluded between those organizations to be extended by law to third parties. The ECL model relies on the willingness and experience of parties to engage in collective bargaining.
Over the last few years, Legal Design has grown as a field of research and practice. The potential of design in the legal domain has been investigated and experimented in various sectors such as access to justice, dispute resolution, privacy indicators, policy prototyping, contractual negotiation. Being an interdisciplinary area of study, Legal Design combines different disciplines and methodologies and relies on insights from legal practice.This book intends to contribute to the study and advancement of Legal Design by presenting different voices and perspectives from scholars and practitioners active in this field. The volume brings together critical essays on the nature and methods of Legal Design and illustrations from the practice. The contributions provide the readers with the state of the art of Legal Design and a prospective outline of its future development. [Publisher's text]
The information paradigm is a core theoretical framework underlying both consumer and data protection legislation. It postulates that providing some key information about a transaction or a data processing protects the rights and interests of the weak party.However, very few users pay attention to the information that is given to them online. In the paper, we argue that there are alternative ways to raise consumers' awareness. An interdisciplinary effort that combines behavioural insights and best practices from information design could address the alleged failure of the information paradigm. To this end, the contribution presents the "Be.aware" app, a legal design solution developed within a research project on the sharing economy in Brussels.