Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 37, Heft 3, S. 261-289
ISSN: 0304-4130
Parliamentary democracy has been widely embraced by politicians & especially by the scholarly community but remains less widely understood. In this essay, I identify the institutional features that define parliamentary democracy & suggest how they can be understood as delegation relationships. I propose two definitions: one minimal & (or ideal-typical). In the latter sense, parliamentary democracy is a particular regime of delegation & accountability that can be understood with the help of agency theory, which allows us to identify the conditions under which democratic agency problems may occur. Parliamentarism is simple, indirect, & relies on lessons gradually acquired in the past. Compared to presidentialism, parliamentarism has certain advantages, such as decisional efficiency & the inducements it creates toward effort. On the other hand, parliamentarism also implies disadvantages such as ineffective accountability & a lack of transparency, which may cause informational inefficiencies, & whereas parliamentarism may be particularly suitable for problems of adverse selection, it is a less certain cure for moral hazard. In contemporary advanced societies, parliamentarism is facing the challenges of decaying screening devices & diverted accountabilities. 1 Figure, 52 References. Adapted from the source document.