Anarchy and the Law: The Political Economy of Choice
In: Independent Studies in Political Economy
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In: Independent Studies in Political Economy
In: Public choice, Band 159, Heft 3, S. 581-583
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 159, Heft 3-4, S. 581-583
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 159, Heft 3-4, S. 581-583
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 136, Heft 1-2, S. 245-247
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 136, Heft 1, S. 245-248
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 136, Heft 1-2, S. 245-247
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 140, Heft 3-4, S. 503-538
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 140, Heft 3-4, S. 503-538
ISSN: 0048-5829
Many economists argue that a pure market economy cannot come about because people will always have incentives to use coercion (Cowen and Sutter, 2005; Holcombe, 2004). We maintain that these economists leave out an important factor in social change. Change can come about by altering incentives or preferences, but since most neoclassical economists ignore changing preferences, they too quickly conclude that change is impossible. History shows that social change based on changes in preferences is common. By recognizing that preferences need not be constant, political economists can say much more about changing the world.
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In: The independent review: journal of political economy, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 543-549
ISSN: 1086-1653
A comment on Randall G. Holcombe's article, "Government: Unnecessary but Inevitable" (2004), points out problems with his theoretical arguments. It is maintained that Holcombe neither shows that anarchy must break down nor that government will remain limited. His contention that state formation is inevitable after the breakdown of anarchy is also challenged, noting that he never spells out the process by which individuals might form a government. Holcombe tends to rely on ideology rather than constitutional constraints as the most important check on government & he offers no solution to the problematic possibility that stronger authoritarian states that concentrate on their military could take over societies that have preemptively created limited governments. Although Holcombe's argument is an advance over that of public-choice economists who view the formation of government as a voluntary social contract, it is concluded that he is too pessimistic about anarchy & too optimistic about government. 21 References. J. Lindroth