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The exact relationship between religiosity and moral values is understudied, and it is unclear what the process of secularization means for the morality of Europeans. Previous research shows that religion is associated with low levels of political and economic development. A potential explanation is that religion provides an alternative moral authority to the authority of the state. Using data from four waves of the European Values Study (EVS) 1981-2008, I analyze attitudes to personal autonomy (vs tradition) and self-interest (vs social norms) in a multilevel model of 48 European countries. The results show that religious decline has been accompanied by an increase in autonomy values, but not self-interest, that the relationship between religion and morality is stronger in more religious countries, and that it has declined since the 1980s. We also show that religiosity is more negatively associated with self-interest among people with low confidence in state authorities.

AbstractThe exact relationship between religiosity and moral values is understudied, and it is unclear what the process of secularization means for the morality of Europeans. Previous research shows that religion is associated with low levels of political and economic development. A potential explanation is that religion provides an alternative moral authority to the authority of the state. Using data from four waves of the European Values Study 1981–2008, I analyze attitudes to personal autonomy (vs tradition) and self-interest (vs social norms) in a multilevel model of 48 European countries. The results show that religious decline has been accompanied by an increase in autonomy values, but not self-interest, that the relationship between religion and morality is stronger in more religious countries, and that it has declined since the 1980s. We also show that religiosity is more negatively associated with self-interest among people with low confidence in state authorities.

The relationship between religion and national identity is a contested topic in public debates about cultural diversity and immigration. In sample surveys only a minority the British population identify themselves as belonging to a Christian religion, and far fewer practise their faith. Nevertheless, nearly a quarter of the population think it is important to be Christian to be truly British. This study explores the complex relationships between religious and national identities in Britain, using data from the 2008 British Social Attitudes Survey. Three different forms of national identity were identified through factor analysis: civic-symbolic, cultural-aesthetic and ethnic national identity. Ethnic national identity is the only dimension of national identity that is positively associated with thinking it is important to be Christian to be British. While churchgoing Christians are more likely to feel national in response to secular cultural symbols, they are less likely to associate religion with nationality than those with a nominal Christian affiliation. The results indicate that Christianity has cultural significance for national identity primarily as a proxy for ethnic identity.

Although many different models of radicalization integrate different intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intergroup processes, this interactive approach is scarcely present in the empirical studies. The goal of this study was to fill this gap by combining personality traits (Machiavellianism), ideology (Islamism), and outcomes of intergroup comparisons (perceived deprivations) as predictors of support for Daesh among Muslims in the MENA region, based on Arab Barometer IV data. Results were calculated on the overall sample and on synthetically balanced samples from Algeria and Palestine, respectively, to ensure the robustness of findings. While Islamists were generally supportive of Daesh, socio-politically deprived individuals were not. A negative relationship between Machiavellianism and support for Daesh was found only in Algeria. Multiple interactions, which differed in Algeria and Palestine, confirm the relevance of studying complex relationships among potential predictors of extremism, as well as the role of context that can strengthen or diminish these relationships.

It is common to portray conservative and liberal Protestant denominations as "strong" and "weak" on the basis of indices such as church attendance. Alternatively, they can be regarded as qualitatively different cultural systems that coexist in a multiple-niche environment. We integrate these two perspectives with a study of American teenagers based on both one-time survey information and the experience sampling method (ESM), which records individual experience on a moment-by-moment basis. Conservative Protestant youth were found to be more satisfied, family-oriented, and sociable than liberal Protestant youth, but also more dependent on their social environment, which is reflected in a deterioration of their mood when they are alone. Liberal Protestant youth appear to have internalized values that remain constant whether in the presence or absence of others. We relate these results to the social scientific literature on liberalism and conservatism and to evolutionary theory as a framework for explaining cultural systems as adaptations to multiple-niche environments. © Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009.

AbstractMany contemporary researchers agree that group relative deprivation is a driver of political actions against outgroups. However, both relative deprivation and political actions are complex phenomena, making it important to further study this relationship in the context of other relevant variables. One such variable could be the specific outgroup. The purpose of our study was to evaluate differences in the contribution of group relative deprivation to the prediction of activist and radicalised intentions against two outgroups – Muslims and senior citizens. The multi‐group structural equation modelling was applied separately on nationally representative samples of youth from Germany (N = 1,056), Norway (N = 376) and the United Kingdom (UK) (N = 1053). Group relative deprivation exhibited a robust relationship with activist intentions after controlling for general aggression, social desirability bias, age and gender, except in the UK, where the relationship between activist intentions and relative deprivation was stronger with Muslims as the target outgroup. The relationship between relative deprivation and radicalised intentions depended on the target outgroup across countries – it was related to radicalised intentions only against Muslims. The meaning and implications of these results are briefly discussed.

AbstractMost literature on racial prejudice deals with the racial attitudes of the ethnic majority and ethnic minorities separately. This paper breaks this tradition. We examine the social distance attitudes of white and non‐white British residents to test if these attitudes follow the same trends over time, whether they are driven by the same social processes and whether they are inter‐related. We have three main findings. Firstly, social distance from other ethnic groups has declined over time for both white and ethnic minority Britons. For the white majority there are both period and cohort elements to this decline. Secondly, we see some evidence that social distance between the majority and minority groups is reciprocal. Specifically, minorities who experience rejection by the white British feel a greater sense of distance from them. Thirdly, we find that all groups share the perception of the same ethnic hierarchy. We see evidence of particularly widespread hostility towards Muslim Britons from all ethnic groups suggesting that Muslims are singled out for negative attention from many British residents of all other backgrounds, including a large number who do not express hostility to other groups.

Die Tendenz, dass Frauen religiöser sind als Männer wurde häufig beobachtet. Zur Begründung dieses Unterschieds wurden viele Theorien formuliert, deren Erklärung von biologisch bis soziologisch reichen; ein Konsens zur Erklärung des Geschlechtsunterschieds in der Religiosität wurde nicht erreicht. Auf der Basis von Daten aus dem European Social Survey, der European Values Study und dem International Social Survey Programme sowie einer neuen Methode zur Messung des Gender Gap vergleichen wir Länder, Generationen und Zeiträume in Europa, um drei Schlüsselfragen zu beantworten: 1) Wie stark hängt der Unterschied zwischen Männern und Frauen vom verwendeten Indikator für Religiosität (z. B. Mitgliedschaft, Kirchgang, Beten, Glauben) ab? 2) Besteht auf der Ebene der Nationalstaaten eine Beziehung zwischen der Größe des Gender Gap und dem Ausmaß der Säkularisierung oder der Gleichheit der Geschlechter? 3) Nähert sich die Religiosität von Männern und Frauen in der Generationenfolge oder über die Zeit an? Die Ergebnisse deuten auf eine Verringerung des Gender Gap in Europa, insbesondere in Süd- und Osteuropa hin, nach wie vor sind jedoch Differenzen beobachtbar. Selbst in sehr säkularen Ländern und solchen, in denen die Ungleichheit zwischen den Geschlechtern stark reduziert wurde, identifizieren sich Frauen deutlich häufiger als Männer mit einer Religionsgemeinschaft, sie halten sich für religiöser und praktizieren ihre Religiosität sowohl öffentlich als auch privat häufiger.