Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article examines interest groups' lobbying success across the agenda‐setting and policy formulation stages of the European Union's policy process. On the basis of its exclusive right of initiative, the European Commission plays a pivotal role in both stages. I argue that interest groups relying mostly on pressure politics are more likely to achieve agenda‐setting success because the Commission primarily seeks to assess the level of political support when setting its policy priorities. Conversely, organisations focusing predominantly on expertise‐based lobbying are anticipated to be more likely to secure policy success as the Commission mainly requires expert knowledge when designing its policy proposals. An illustrative case study of the Commission's proposal on deforestation‐free products demonstrates the plausibility of the theoretical argument. Overall, this research shows that distinct policy stages provide interest groups with unique opportunities for attaining lobbying success.

AbstractThis paper seeks to explain under which conditions policymakers actively reach out to interest groups. Policymakers are often expected to contact affluent groups more often than resource‐strapped ones because these organizations can provide them with more and better policy expertise. I argue that economic resources are less important than often assumed and expect that the role of financial means in enjoying outreach from policymakers is contingent on the degree of membership influence. To test this argument empirically, I rely on survey data of over 2.500 interest groups active in six European countries varying in democratic maturity. The results demonstrate that wealthy groups are contacted more frequently than economically deprived ones, but only when members exert a strong influence over the group's political positioning. This is true except for relatively new democracies where the effect of economic resources does not vary systematically across differential levels of membership influence.

Abstract
This study examines interest groups' influence on the European Commission's policy agenda. We argue that organizations can gain agenda-setting influence by strategically emphasizing different types of information. Analyzing a novel dataset on the engagement of 158 interest groups across 65 policy issues, we find that prioritizing information about audience support is more advantageous than emphasizing expert information. However, the effectiveness of highlighting the scope of audience support depends on the level of issue salience and degree of interest mobilization. Specifically, our findings indicate that when dealing with issues characterized by quiet politics, there are no systematic differences among groups employing distinct modes of informational lobbying.

Abstract
In recent years, the movement of personnel from the public sector to interest groups has garnered considerable attention throughout Europe. Consequently, there has been an increased focus on the phenomenon of revolving door lobbyists within academic literature. This research contributes to this scholarly discussion by examining how the employment of such lobbyists facilitates access. We argue that interest groups gain advantages by recruiting individuals from the public sector in policy domains with limited mobilization, but this benefit decreases as more interest groups mobilize. Our analysis of survey data from seven European political systems supports these expectations, indicating that recruiting professionals with experience in the public sector enhances access, especially in policy areas with minimal lobbying activity. This highlights the potential for interest mobilization to counterbalance the advantages of hiring revolving door lobbyists.

This paper evaluates the circumstances under which affluent interest groups wield influence over policy outcomes. Interest group scholarship is ambiguous about the beneficial role of economic resources for lobbying influence. Economically resourceful groups are often presumed to provide more and better expert information to decision-makers and, in exchange, receive more favourable policy concessions. We argue that the beneficial role of economic resources is contingent on the media salience of policy dossiers. We expect that resourceful groups are more influential when issues are discussed behind the public scenes, while their competitive advantage dampens once issues grow salient in the news media. We test our expectations in the context of European Union policymaking, drawing from 183 expert surveys with lobbyists connected to a sample of 41 policy issues. Our empirical findings demonstrate that economic resources matter for lobbying influence, but that their effect is conditional on the media salience of policy issues.