Contents: Preface -- Part I Introduction -- 1. How we got here -- 2. New institutional economics -- Part II Legal systems and development -- 3. Legal origin theory and the transplant effect -- 4. A new institutional economics approach to law and development -- Part III Finance and development -- 5. Financial markets -- 6. Estimating the determinants of growth: an empirical exploration of an NIE framework -- Part IV: Conclusion -- 7. Conclusions -- References -- Index.
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In a series of books beginning in 1949 with Expectation in Economics, G.L.S. Shackle has analysed business decisions made under conditions of uncertainty (see Shackle, 1949,1955,1961,1970). In these he rejects the orthodox, probability‐based, approach of expected utility theory and outlines his own "model" of the decision process. This "model" is outlined in the next section. A number of criticisms which have been made of the Shackle theory are discussed in the third section together with responses which seek to preserve the underlying spirit of Professor Shackle's approach. The fourth section examines the relative merits of the orthodox mode of analysis and that of Professor Shackle as rationalisations of the judicial standard of negligence used in England and the United States.
The myth of American exceptionalism in the matter of plea-bargaining is certainly by now quite untrue. In addition to forming an important part of criminal procedure in the United Kingdom, plea-bargaining has been transplanted to several civil law countries such as France and Italy. Informal versions, based on non-trial settlement, have been observed in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and around the world. The Law and Economics literature on plea-bargaining views it as an efficient instrument of criminal procedure because it reduces enforcement costs (for both parties) and allows the prosecutor to concentrate on more meritorious cases. Yet the success of transplants relies on the existence of appropriate incentives, and the detailed study of the Italian experience provides a good indication that the traditional inquisitorial system might not generate such incentives. Instead, this article offers a new theory emphasizing the role of the prosecutor and that of the defence counsel. We argue that the incentives of the prosecutor and those of the defence counsellor are determinants of the success or failure of plea-bargaining. We are sceptical that plea-bargaining can lead to or is consistent with the desirable outcome in many circumstances. In particular, a major implication of our analysis is that the comparative efficiency of plea-bargaining to a larger extent depends on the possibility of a legal system to address the multiple principle-agent problems in criminal litigation.
The economic literature on enforcement is generally pessimistic concerning the use of legal aid. In this paper we show that legal aid can be a part of optimal law enforcement. The rationale behind our result is that with legal aid, in a system with legal or judicial error both guilty and innocent individuals are better off, because the marginal cost of defence expenditure is reduced. If, on average, legal aid helps the innocent more than the guilty, a government seeking to maximize social welfare will want to use it in order to increase deterrence.
