Suchergebnisse

Contributes to the debate by examining the politics and development of 2 separate policy issues in Social Democratic Sweden. Examines the development of Swedish taxation policy from the 1920s-1980s, and a more recent innovation--wage-earner funds. Demonstrates that the constant and close interaction between the Social Democratic elite and their technical/administrative agents has in the end shaped the party elite's ideology. (JLN)

Concerned with the influence of the British system of 'party government' on tax policy outputs, examines the postwar trends in the rates of income tax, corporation tax and consumption taxes in the UK. Concludes that there is a relationship between the trend in tax rates and the party in office. (Abstract amended)

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from SAGE Publications via the DOI in this record. ; Studies examining the effects of gender on honesty, deceptive behavior, pro-sociality, and risk aversion, often find significant differences between men and women. The present study contributes to the debate by exploiting one of the largest tax compliance experiments to date in a highly controlled environment conducted in the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Italy. Our expectation was that the differences between men's and women's behavior would correlate broadly with the degree of gender equality in each country. Where social, political and cultural gender equality is greater we expected behavioral differences between men and women to be smaller. In contrast, our evidence reveals that women are significantly more compliant than men in all countries. Furthermore, these patterns are quite consistent across countries in our study. In other words, the difference between men's and women's behavior is not significantly different in more gender neutral countries than in more traditional societies. ; This work was supported by the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) (grant number 295675).