Suchergebnisse

How do bank supervisors strike a balance between market self-regulation and pro-active regulatory intervention? This book investigates the choice of banking supervision approach in four European Union member states from Central and Eastern Europe -- Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia -- after their transition to democracy and market economy. Drawing on interviews with bank supervisors and decision-makers, the study examines why the four states show different calibrations of the balance between market-based regulation and risk-averse counter-cyclical regulation across countries and over time. The book sheds lights on a core tension in the European Banking Union: should rules be homogenous across jurisdiction to ensure a level playing field, or should national regulators have room to impose stricter or more lax regulations?

This article examines banking structural reforms introduced in the European Union (EU), placed in an international context. The concept of 'regulatory cascading' is put forward to investigate how European policy-makers tackle complex multi-faceted problems, such as that of banks which are 'too big to fail'. The article shows that partial solutions to the problem introduced in other areas of banking regulation, coupled with strategic activism at the domestic level by key EU member states have constrained the opportunities to design a coherent EU framework regulating bank structures. In response to the Commission's proposal for harmonised European banking structural reforms, the Council has stressed in its position two approaches that closely correspond to the measures adopted in France and Germany, on the one hand, and the UK, on the other hand.

What is the optimal scope of regulatory harmonization in European financial sector governance? I argue that the levels of foreign ownership and domestic bank internationalization are important determinants of the extent to which governments are prepared to endorse European solutions in banking supervision or prefer national ones. I test two hypotheses about the impact of foreign ownership and domestic bank internationalization on regulatory preferences. This article shows that being a host jurisdiction to foreign financial institutions constrains states' ability to steer credit flows and tackle perceived threats to national financial stability. As a consequence, decision-makers seek to preserve some national regulatory autonomy. Especially during economic downturns, national supervisory authorities have strong incentives to pursue policies that minimize losses for domestic stakeholders and shift burdens onto foreign ones. Adapted from the source document.