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The authors develop a model of alliances with outside options to study burden sharing in nonbinding alliance agreements. The analysis provides an explanation for the variation in ally contributions to NATO over time and why the post—Cold War period has seen an increase in the use of coalitions of the willing. Additionally, the analysis reveals something of an initiator's disadvantage in burden sharing—the initiator of an alliance action pays a disproportionate cost of the military burden. The authors' argument provides an alternative explanation for why the United States has been consistently the largest contributor to NATO.

How does the existence of an international institution change the strategic calculations of states engaged in an international dispute? This paper investigates the question by modeling an international institution as an alternative to bilateral bargaining for a dispute settlement. The equilibrium results show that only one of the two countries may find the option of appealing to an international institution attractive, and that the institution can influence the bargaining outcome even when it is not directly involved in settling the dispute. Moreover, the results show that countries condition their behavior on the type of the institution that they are dealing with: While a high capacity institution can induce cooperation, a low capacity institution does not. These findings have important implications for WTO reforms and provide an explanation for restrictive membership adopted by many significant international institutions. Adapted from the source document.

Why did President Bush attempt to acquire a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force before the war with Iraq, even though there was a substantial risk that his request would be rejected? This article presents a game‐theoretic model to investigate how international institutions can shape the behavior of democratic leaders by influencing domestic politics. While it seems unsurprising that unbiased leaders who are truly concerned about foreign policy outcomes would consult international institutions, the results show that biased leaders with private agendas can also be forced to behave like the unbiased type because of their electoral concerns. The equilibrium results are illustrated with the cases of U.S. use of force in international crises.

Under what conditions is the American public supportive of U.S. military intervention in foreign crises? We argue that the public assesses three key dimensions of an intervention: the motivation for an intervention, the form an intervention can take, and the tasks an intervention may be mandated to fulfill. Through a survey experiment, we test several hypotheses in the context of a potential U.S. military intervention in a civil war. Comparing different motivations, we find that the strategies (forms and mandates) matter much more for public support. Regardless of motivation, the American public is generally more supportive of multilateral forms of intervention and prefers mandates that focus on the protection of civilians and peaceful conflict resolution.

Under what conditions is the American public supportive of U.S. military intervention in foreign crises? We argue that the public assesses three key dimensions of an intervention: the motivation for an intervention, the form an intervention can take, and the tasks an intervention may be mandated to fulfill. Through a survey experiment, we test several hypotheses in the context of a potential U.S. military intervention in a civil war. Comparing different motivations, we find that the strategies (forms and mandates) matter much more for public support. Regardless of motivation, the American public is generally more supportive of multilateral forms of intervention and prefers mandates that focus on the protection of civilians and peaceful conflict resolution.