Suchergebnisse

This dissertation examines the causes and electoral consequences of political dynasties in developed democracies. The researcher develops a model of candidate recruitment and selection to explain the persistence of "legacy politics" in some democracies, such as Japan, focusing in particular on electoral rules and internal party recruitment processes. This model is then tested using legislator-level biographical data from eight democracies, and an in-depth, candidate-level case study of Japan, where electoral reform has also resulted in party adaptation in candidate selection methods. The researcher finds that "legacy" candidates enjoy an "inherited incumbency advantage" in both the selection and election stages of their careers. However, the relative value of this inherited incumbency advantage varies significantly by the institutional contexts of the electoral system and the candidate recruitment process within parties

Parliamentary democracy means that the political executive is accountable to the parliamentary majority. However, when both the parliamentary majority and the cabinet consist of two or more distinct political parties, it is often difficult for the parliamentary majority to monitor and control the executive. In this article, we focus on political delegation from parliamentarians to the executive branch under multiparty parliamentary government. We identify the most important mechanisms parliamentary parties employ to remedy the accountability problems that may arise, as well as the arenas in which they are exercised: the executive arena, the parliamentary arena, and the extraparliamentary arena. We discuss the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms arena by arena, examine their use in 15 Western European countries that frequently feature coalition governments, and review our knowledge of how parliaments and parliamentary parties control political delegation and accountability in coalition governments.