Suchergebnisse

The article continues the study of the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko in the formation, development and maintenance of security policy, its principles and structural elements. The relevance of the article is determined by the importance of strategy and strategic thinking in modern foreign policy and diplomacy, their influence on interstate cooperation, the evolution and manageability of international relations. The chronological framework is limited to the events of 1971. The importance of these events allowed the author to identify and characterise some elements of the complex and controversial process of setting up for a future conference on security and cooperation in Europe, as well as to analyse A.A. Gromyko's strategy of in this setting. The studied materials are presented in six subsections. The scientific novelty of the first subsection lies in the consideration of the logic and features of the diplomatic game of the West. The scientific novelty of the second subsection consists of five differences in the approaches of L.I. Brezhnev and A.A. Gromyko, who could help or hinder the defense of the interests of the Soviet Union at a future conference. The scientific novelty of the third subsection lies in the consideration of the Soviet position on a conference on security and cooperation in Europe by Western diplomats. The scientific novelty of the fourth and fifth subsections was determined by the proof of the hypothesis that A.A. Gromyko had two plans - in case the conference was convened or postponed. In the fourth and fifth subsections, the author presents the main activities and expected results of «Plan A» and «Plan B». The sixth subsection is devoted to conclusions that can be classified into historical conclusions (conclusion 3) and historical and political conclusions (conclusions 1-2, 4-5). The results obtained make it possible to test hypotheses related to the influence of the personal factor (long-term holding of a responsible position; constant strengthening of influence, authority and opportunities) on foreign policy and evolutionary processes in the systems of international relations. In relation to 1971, the author discovered Soviet version of the "magnet theory" developed by A.A. Gromyko's. The sources of the article are published documents of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, the use of which can be explained methodologically. It was important for the author to conduct the analysis on the basis of the foreign partners' assessment of the statements made by the Soviet Foreign Minister during official negotiations (outer reflection). The author's reasoning should be understood in the context of his earlier article in the journal.

The article continues the study of the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko in the shaping, development and maintenance of security policy, its principles and structural elements. The relevance of the article is determined by the importance of strategy and strategic thinking in modern foreign policy and diplomacy, their influence on interstate cooperation, the evolution and manageability of international relations. The subject of the article is the study of the strategic project of detente developed by A.A. Gromyko to 1972-1973. The chronological framework of the study is limited to 1972 and 1973. The article consists of three subsections. The first subsection examines the criteria for bilateralism and presents the conditions for concluding new agreements, substantiates the importance of purposeful work on new agreements. The second subsection analyzes the differences between formal balance and equal security. At present, the concept of «equal security» has become a structural element of the foreign policy doctrine and security doctrine of the Russian Federation. The third subsection characterizes the content of the strategic project, the features of differentiated cooperation - the interaction of the USSR with small, medium and large countries, shows the meaning of the concept of «pure national interest», mechanisms for the transition to a «long-term detente» of international tension. The author explores the approaches of A.A. Gromyko to a new system of international relations during the negotiations on the Moscow Treaty. The possible practical application of the main elements of the project in modern times is determined. The sources of the article are published documents of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany. The author conducts the analysis on the basis of the foreign partners' assessment of the statements made by the Soviet Foreign Minister during official negotiations.

Large-scale transformation tasks, features of intellectual cultures, features of traditions, current political goals, balances and parities, crises and conflicts make it difficult to formulate a modernization policy in the countries of the collective West. Despite the difficulties, Germany's ruling parties are trying to develop common approaches. The article characterizes the current state of formation of Germany's modernization strategy. The first section analyzes the position of the Minister of Economy, representative of the Green Party, R. Habeck, and notes his intention to make the country's «green modernization» irreversible. According to Habeck, accelerating modernization will allow to quickly overcome crises and complete the transformation of the model of German society and the German state. The second section examines the approach of Finance Minister K. Lindner. For Lindner, the success of modernization depends on the use of liberal methods. We are talking about abandoning government subsidies and encouraging the initiative of entrepreneurs. The third section analyzes the project of one of the leaders of the SPD, L. Klingbeil. He sees priorities in agreeing on a new European security and in cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In the fourth section, the decision of the Constitutional Court of Germany was analyzed. Thanks to this decision, the ruling parties will be forced to come to a common approach regarding national priorities. The practical significance of the article is determined by the influence of modernization on other areas of public policy

. This article opens a series of research papers dedicated to the former Foreign Minister of the USSR Andrei Gromyko. His contribution to the development and implementation of the security policy is highlighted. The détente policy is understood as part of the security policy. The first article defines the security policy. The most important stages of A. Gromyko diplomatic career are highlighted. Problems of foreign policy continuity, the role that the personal factor plays, and the relationship between strategy and tactics are particularly important in the research the security policy. A distinction must be made between strategy and tactics in politics and diplomacy. This has an essential practical meaning because a correct balance of tactical and strategic approaches is a prerequisite for the success of the security system, which can be built within the framework of a certain paradigm. The author argues that the descriptive story (Part 4 of the article) is one of the possible variants of historiography explaining the role of the personal factor. Much more important, however, is to supplement traditional history with research, because this can lead to the «Gromyko rules» (Part 3 of the article). This helps to better articulate the lessons of history. The article contributes to the author's earlier works on the role of A. Gromyko and his diplomatic school.

The article continues to explore a topic of «Sources of European Security».The author analyzes the role of personalities, processes and factors that have influenced the modern European security system, sustainable and variable elements of the transformation of the European segment of international relations. On the basis of documents from the Swiss Federal Archives, this article highlightsthe position of Switzerland and, in some cases, Austria before the start of the substantive discussions of the agreed agenda at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The 1970 Moscow Treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany and the start of the CSCE process led to the Soviet Union abandoning its longstanding attempts to establish cooperation between the great powers in parallel with the UN structures.The Foreign Minister of the USSR Andrei Gromyko warned against this. Subsequently, the role of the small and medium-sized countries in the two ideological camps increased. The overall picture of interstate relations became more complicated. It is therefore no coincidence that the CSCE is treatedcontroversially in historiography. Considering that transformations are associated with continuous forms, positions, and mechanisms that have been tested over time, the author makes hypotheses and recommendations at the end of the article.

Modern political activity develops on the basis of disclosure and partial correction of previously developed algorithms and approaches, which significantly increases the practical significance of the historical and political science methodology, with the help of which it is possible to identify the content, directions of evolution, the prospects for changing traditional models and phenomena. The article attempts to study the essence of the security phenomenon in the context of currently emerging paradigms. The working hypothesis was the assumption that the transformational processes of the 1970's, which subsequently experienced a «security swing», their elements, system hierarchy and logic of representation continue to persist in the current Western model, since multi-factor and successful transformations slow down change. As a result of the study, disparities in the substantive definition of security goals, contradictions between political goals and processes were revealed, a working hypothesis was confirmed, and problems that require further study, including through the expansion of the empirical base, were outlined. The article is written mainly on the materials of the three «White Papers» of the Bundeswehr. It is controversial in nature, but already at this stage of the study has a practical value, reflected in four recommendation-prognostic conclusions.