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Dependence on oil for transport is a concern for India's policymakers on three counts – energy security, local environment and climate change. Rapid urbanisation and accompanying motorisation has created some of the most polluting cities in India and rising demand for oil is leading to higher imports, besides causing more CO2 emissions. The government of India wants to achieve the climate goals through a sustainability approach that simultaneously addresses other environment and developmental challenges. This paper analyses a sustainable low carbon transport (SLCT) scenario based on sustainable strategies for passenger and freight mobility, vehicle technologies and fuel using global CO2 prices that correspond to 2 °C global stabilisation target. The scenarios span from years 2010 to 2050 and are analysed using the energy system model-ANSWER MARKAL. The SLCT scenario has improved energy security (cumulative oil demand lower by 3100 Mtoe), improved air quality (PM 2.5 emissions never exceed the existing levels) and the cumulative CO2 emissions are lower by 13 billion t CO2 thereby showing that achieving development objectives with CO2 co-benefits is feasible.

Globally there is a greater commitment among national governments towards the achievement of the global 2 °C temperature stabilisation target and doubling the rate of energy intensity improvement. India's energy demand and energy imports have risen sizably over the past two decades. In 2014, India imported 83 % of its oil, 29 % of coal and 68 % of natural gas demand. Improving energy efficiency (EE) is identified among the prominent options in India's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) communicated to the Paris Agreement. EE, other than mitigating carbon emissions, also contributes to improving energy security and air quality. EE measures are hence pervasive as they anchor efficient and cleaner technologies in the supply-chain covering production, distribution and consumption. This paper analyses role of EE technologies, policies and measures in India under global carbon emissions mitigation scenarios that target temperature stabilisation 'well-below 2 °C'. The analysis is carried out using ANSWER-MARKAL, an energy system optimisation model. The analysis focuses on high impact opportunities including the energy intensive industry sectors (electricity supply, industry and transport). The results are reported for medium-term (year - 2030) and long-term (year - 2050). The analysis concludes that energy efficiency measures reduce CO2 emissions, promote cleaner production by reducing fossil-based energy and deliver benefits of energy security and improved air quality. The paper finally highlights the elements of the policy roadmap for transitions towards clean and energy efficient technology future in the medium and long-term.

Climate policies must deal with a contradiction generic to global environment policies: as was recognized as early as in 1972 at the UN conference on Human Environment at Stockholm, the participation of developing countries is essential. The current emissions of developing countries are also significant. If the trend continues, the future share of global emissions from developing countries will be even larger. However, developing countries do not yet see the need to cooperate because they perceive environmental issues to be a form of Malthusianism. Thus, despite repeated calls for sustainable development at Rio (1992), the negotiations for framing a climate regime have remained disengaged from the debates on how to embark on sound development paths, thus tying a Gordian knot through a succession of misunderstandings. This unhappy turn in policy talks is all the more grave as the timing of the climate change issue is inopportune for developing countries. The increasing attention to the climate change phenomenon has coincided with a period in which many developing countries are experiencing rapid economic growth and in which global power equations are changing (military power, globalization of world markets, and control over natural resources). No sword of a present-day Alexander can cut this knot tied by history. The aim of this chapter is to pick out the threads that, when pulled, may untie the knot.

Climate policies must deal with a contradiction generic to global environment policies: as was recognized as early as in 1972 at the UN conference on Human Environment at Stockholm, the participation of developing countries is essential. The current emissions of developing countries are also significant. If the trend continues, the future share of global emissions from developing countries will be even larger. However, developing countries do not yet see the need to cooperate because they perceive environmental issues to be a form of Malthusianism. Thus, despite repeated calls for sustainable development at Rio (1992), the negotiations for framing a climate regime have remained disengaged from the debates on how to embark on sound development paths, thus tying a Gordian knot through a succession of misunderstandings. This unhappy turn in policy talks is all the more grave as the timing of the climate change issue is inopportune for developing countries. The increasing attention to the climate change phenomenon has coincided with a period in which many developing countries are experiencing rapid economic growth and in which global power equations are changing (military power, globalization of world markets, and control over natural resources). No sword of a present-day Alexander can cut this knot tied by history. The aim of this chapter is to pick out the threads that, when pulled, may untie the knot.

Climate policies must deal with a contradiction generic to global environment policies: as was recognized as early as in 1972 at the UN conference on Human Environment at Stockholm, the participation of developing countries is essential. The current emissions of developing countries are also significant. If the trend continues, the future share of global emissions from developing countries will be even larger. However, developing countries do not yet see the need to cooperate because they perceive environmental issues to be a form of Malthusianism. Thus, despite repeated calls for sustainable development at Rio (1992), the negotiations for framing a climate regime have remained disengaged from the debates on how to embark on sound development paths, thus tying a Gordian knot through a succession of misunderstandings. This unhappy turn in policy talks is all the more grave as the timing of the climate change issue is inopportune for developing countries. The increasing attention to the climate change phenomenon has coincided with a period in which many developing countries are experiencing rapid economic growth and in which global power equations are changing (military power, globalization of world markets, and control over natural resources). No sword of a present-day Alexander can cut this knot tied by history. The aim of this chapter is to pick out the threads that, when pulled, may untie the knot.

Climate policies must deal with a contradiction generic to global environment policies: as was recognized as early as in 1972 at the UN conference on Human Environment at Stockholm, the participation of developing countries is essential. The current emissions of developing countries are also significant. If the trend continues, the future share of global emissions from developing countries will be even larger. However, developing countries do not yet see the need to cooperate because they perceive environmental issues to be a form of Malthusianism. Thus, despite repeated calls for sustainable development at Rio (1992), the negotiations for framing a climate regime have remained disengaged from the debates on how to embark on sound development paths, thus tying a Gordian knot through a succession of misunderstandings. This unhappy turn in policy talks is all the more grave as the timing of the climate change issue is inopportune for developing countries. The increasing attention to the climate change phenomenon has coincided with a period in which many developing countries are experiencing rapid economic growth and in which global power equations are changing (military power, globalization of world markets, and control over natural resources). No sword of a present-day Alexander can cut this knot tied by history. The aim of this chapter is to pick out the threads that, when pulled, may untie the knot.

Stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at any level will require deep reductions in GHG emissions. Net global CO2 emissions, in particular, must eventually be brought to or below zero. Emissions reductions of this magnitude will require large-scale transformations in human societies, from the way that we produce and consume energy to how we use the land surface. The more ambitious the stabilization goal, the more rapid this transformation must occur. A natural question in this context is what will be the transformation pathway toward stabilization; that is, how do we get from here to there? The topic of this chapter is transformation pathways. The chapter is motivated primarily by three questions. First, what are the near-term and future choices that define transformation pathways including, for example, the goal itself, the emissions pathway to the goal, the technologies used for and sectors contributing to mitigation, the nature of international coordination, and mitigation policies? Second, what are the key decision making outcomes of different transformation pathways, including the magnitude and international distribution of economic costs and the implications for other policy objectives such as those associated with sustainable development? Third, how will actions taken today influence the options that might be available in the future? Two concepts are particularly important for framing any answers to these questions. The first is that there is no single pathway to stabilization of GHG concentrations at any level. Instead, the literature elucidates a wide range of transformation pathways. Choices will govern which pathway is followed. These choices include, among other things, the long-term stabilization goal, the emissions pathway to meet that goal, the degree to which concentrations might temporarily overshoot the goal, the technologies that will be deployed to reduce emissions, the degree to which mitigation is coordinated across countries, the policy approaches used to achieve these goals within and across countries, the treatment of land use, and the manner in which mitigation is meshed with other policy objectives such as sustainable development. The second concept is that transformation pathways can be distinguished from one another in important ways. Weighing the characteristics of different pathways is the way in which deliberative decisions about transformation pathways would be made. Although measures of aggregate economic implications have often been put forward as key deliberative decision making factors, these are far from the only characteristics that matter for making good decisions. Transformation pathways inherently involve a range of tradeoffs that link to other national and policy objectives such as energy and food security, the distribution of economic costs, local air pollution, other environmental factors associated with different technology solutions (e.g., nuclear power, coal-fired carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)), and economic competitiveness. Many of these fall under the umbrella of sustainable development. A question that is often raised about particular stabilization goals and transformation pathways to those goals is whether the goals or pathways are "feasible". In many circumstances, there are clear physical constraints that can render particular long-term goals physically impossible. For example, if additinional mitigation beyond that of today is delayed to a large enough degree and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) options are not available (see Section 6.9), a goal of reaching 450 ppm CO2eq by the end of the 21st century can be physically impossible. However, in many cases, statements about feasibility are bound up in subjective assessments of the degree to which other characteristics of particular transformation pathways might influence the ability or desire of human societies to follow them. Important characteristics include economic implications, social acceptance of new technologies that underpin particular transformation pathways, the rapidity at which social and technological systems would need to change to follow particular pathways, political feasibility, and linkages to other national objectives. A primary goal of this chapter is to illuminate these characteristics of transformation pathways.

Stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at any level will require deep reductions in GHG emissions. Net global CO2 emissions, in particular, must eventually be brought to or below zero. Emissions reductions of this magnitude will require large-scale transformations in human societies, from the way that we produce and consume energy to how we use the land surface. The more ambitious the stabilization goal, the more rapid this transformation must occur. A natural question in this context is what will be the transformation pathway toward stabilization; that is, how do we get from here to there? The topic of this chapter is transformation pathways. The chapter is motivated primarily by three questions. First, what are the near-term and future choices that define transformation pathways including, for example, the goal itself, the emissions pathway to the goal, the technologies used for and sectors contributing to mitigation, the nature of international coordination, and mitigation policies? Second, what are the key decision making outcomes of different transformation pathways, including the magnitude and international distribution of economic costs and the implications for other policy objectives such as those associated with sustainable development? Third, how will actions taken today influence the options that might be available in the future? Two concepts are particularly important for framing any answers to these questions. The first is that there is no single pathway to stabilization of GHG concentrations at any level. Instead, the literature elucidates a wide range of transformation pathways. Choices will govern which pathway is followed. These choices include, among other things, the long-term stabilization goal, the emissions pathway to meet that goal, the degree to which concentrations might temporarily overshoot the goal, the technologies that will be deployed to reduce emissions, the degree to which mitigation is coordinated across countries, the policy approaches used to achieve these goals within and across countries, the treatment of land use, and the manner in which mitigation is meshed with other policy objectives such as sustainable development. The second concept is that transformation pathways can be distinguished from one another in important ways. Weighing the characteristics of different pathways is the way in which deliberative decisions about transformation pathways would be made. Although measures of aggregate economic implications have often been put forward as key deliberative decision making factors, these are far from the only characteristics that matter for making good decisions. Transformation pathways inherently involve a range of tradeoffs that link to other national and policy objectives such as energy and food security, the distribution of economic costs, local air pollution, other environmental factors associated with different technology solutions (e.g., nuclear power, coal-fired carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)), and economic competitiveness. Many of these fall under the umbrella of sustainable development. A question that is often raised about particular stabilization goals and transformation pathways to those goals is whether the goals or pathways are "feasible". In many circumstances, there are clear physical constraints that can render particular long-term goals physically impossible. For example, if additinional mitigation beyond that of today is delayed to a large enough degree and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) options are not available (see Section 6.9), a goal of reaching 450 ppm CO2eq by the end of the 21st century can be physically impossible. However, in many cases, statements about feasibility are bound up in subjective assessments of the degree to which other characteristics of particular transformation pathways might influence the ability or desire of human societies to follow them. Important characteristics include economic implications, social acceptance of new technologies that underpin particular transformation pathways, the rapidity at which social and technological systems would need to change to follow particular pathways, political feasibility, and linkages to other national objectives. A primary goal of this chapter is to illuminate these characteristics of transformation pathways.

Governments worldwide have agreed that international climate policy should aim to limit the increase of global mean temperature to less than 2oC with respect to pre-industrial levels. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the emission reductions and related energy system changes in various countries in pathways consistent with the 2oC target. We synthesize and provide an overview of the national and regional information contained in different scenarios from various global models published over the last few years, as well as yet unpublished scenarios submitted by modelling teams participating in the MILES project (Modelling and Informing Low-Emission Strategies). We find that emissions in the mitigation scenarios are significantly reduced in all regions compared to the baseline without climate policies. The regional cumulative CO2 emissions show on average a 76% reduction between the baseline and 450 scenario. The 450 scenarios show a reduction of primary energy demand in all countries of roughly 30-40% compared to the baseline. In the baseline scenario, the contribution of low-carbon energy technology remains around 15%, i.e. similar as today. In the mitigation scenario, these numbers are scaled up rapidly towards 2050. Looking at air quality, sulphur dioxide and black carbon emissions are strongly reduced as a co-benefit of greenhouse gas emission reductions, in both developing and developed countries. However, black carbon emissions increase in countries that strongly rely on bioenergy to reach mitigation targets. Concerning energy security, energy importing countries generally experience a decrease in net-energy imports in mitigation scenarios compared to the baseline development, while energy exporters experience a loss of energy export revenues.

Les 16 équipes de chercheurs mobilisées dans le cadre du projet ont élaboré et approfondi leurs trajectoires de décarbonation par rapport au rapport 2014, affinant leurs résultats et conclusions par l'intermédiaire de plusieurs scénarios définissant différentes orientations possibles de décarbonation pour un même pays.À l'échelle globale, le rapport montre que la décarbonation profonde des économies actuellement les plus émettrices est techniquement faisable, tout en prenant en compte les projections attendues de croissance démographique et économique. D'ores et déjà, ces tendances de décarbonation apparaissent compatibles avec l'objectif de 2°C maximum de réchauffement à l'horizon 2100 ; et des potentiels de réduction d'émissions plus drastiques encore ont été identifiés par les différentes équipes. Ces conclusions pourront en outre, à l'avenir, être complétées par d'autres pays et par la prise en compte de sources d'émissions provenant de sources non analysées par le DDPP (affectation des terres, procédés industriels, etc.).Le rapport 2015 insiste particulièrement sur la compatibilité des objectifs de décarbonation et de développement économique et social. Décarboner permet en effet en premier lieu d'éviter les effets délétères du changement climatique, et s'inscrit en parallèle dans une stratégie d'amélioration significative de services essentiels comme l'accès à l'énergie. Les stratégies de décarbonation profonde peuvent contribuer au développement durable des pays.Enfin, les investissements nécessaires à la décarbonation profonde, de l'ordre de 0,8% du PIB en 2020 (1,3 % en 2050), ne représentent pas un surcoût majeur par rapport aux investissements nécessaires en l'absence de politiques climatiques. De plus, sous réserve de signaux adéquats sur le long terme, la réorientation des investissements vers les technologies bas carbone ouvrent d'importantes perspectives commerciales.Dans le cadre de la COP21, où se négocie ces jours-ci un accord pour un nouveau régime climatique à partir de 2020, les stratégies ...

Les 16 équipes de chercheurs mobilisées dans le cadre du projet ont élaboré et approfondi leurs trajectoires de décarbonation par rapport au rapport 2014, affinant leurs résultats et conclusions par l'intermédiaire de plusieurs scénarios définissant différentes orientations possibles de décarbonation pour un même pays.À l'échelle globale, le rapport montre que la décarbonation profonde des économies actuellement les plus émettrices est techniquement faisable, tout en prenant en compte les projections attendues de croissance démographique et économique. D'ores et déjà, ces tendances de décarbonation apparaissent compatibles avec l'objectif de 2°C maximum de réchauffement à l'horizon 2100 ; et des potentiels de réduction d'émissions plus drastiques encore ont été identifiés par les différentes équipes. Ces conclusions pourront en outre, à l'avenir, être complétées par d'autres pays et par la prise en compte de sources d'émissions provenant de sources non analysées par le DDPP (affectation des terres, procédés industriels, etc.).Le rapport 2015 insiste particulièrement sur la compatibilité des objectifs de décarbonation et de développement économique et social. Décarboner permet en effet en premier lieu d'éviter les effets délétères du changement climatique, et s'inscrit en parallèle dans une stratégie d'amélioration significative de services essentiels comme l'accès à l'énergie. Les stratégies de décarbonation profonde peuvent contribuer au développement durable des pays.Enfin, les investissements nécessaires à la décarbonation profonde, de l'ordre de 0,8% du PIB en 2020 (1,3 % en 2050), ne représentent pas un surcoût majeur par rapport aux investissements nécessaires en l'absence de politiques climatiques. De plus, sous réserve de signaux adéquats sur le long terme, la réorientation des investissements vers les technologies bas carbone ouvrent d'importantes perspectives commerciales.Dans le cadre de la COP21, où se négocie ces jours-ci un accord pour un nouveau régime climatique à partir de 2020, les stratégies de décarbonation sont indispensables pour informer les feuilles de route portant sur les choix de long terme, évitant ainsi des situations de blocage (lock-in), notamment technologiques, pouvant in fine freiner l'action climatique et en retarder ses effets.