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Explores the potential benefits that lowering the age at which offenders are tried as adults from 18 to 16 (or 15) would have on juvenile crime. US Dept of Justice statistics indicate increases in juvenile crime 1988-1992 (particularly violent crimes), but only 5% of juveniles are tried in federal courts as adults & in many states, felonies committed by minors are not made public. Because of the recidivism among juvenile offenders, reclassifying them as adults would mean that many would serve longer sentences because they would not be treated as first-time offenders, & adult courts are less lenient. It is proposed that longer sentences would result in less crime committed by repeat juvenile offenders & also serve as a deterrent. 7 References. C. Haywood

The authors demonstrate that most textbooks are ambiguous at best in their treatment of cross price and income elasticity of demand. There is also no discussion of what initiates a price increase in discussions of substitutes and complements in the textbooks examined. The authors offer a remedy for these deficiencies.

Galles and Sexton (1998) showed that California state and local revenues exceeded their previous real per capita levels as did the sum of property taxes plus charges and miscellaneous revenues within a decade after Proposition 13 passed, and concluded that Proposition 13 was only temporarily successful at shrinking California state and local governments. Khoury and Pal (2000) challenge this conclusion. However, their conclusion that Proposition 13'mvention "n only marginal"from using per $1000 of income comparisons rather than real per capita comparisons and from using growth rate changes, which fail to adjust for U.S. fiscal trends, instead of changes in the levels of variables as their primary measure.

ABSTRACT Cebula (1999) suggests that the success of California's Proposition 13 and Massachusetts'Proposition 2‐1/2 is better judged by their effects on the growth rates of real per capita revenues and expenditures rather than on the levels of those variables, which Galles and Sexton (1998) used to evaluate those measures. However, the data shows that virtually all of their effects, relative to the United States as a whole, arose during their implementation periods, and that there is no clear evidence of the "longer term success in terms of reducing the growth rate of real per capita revenues and expenditures" that Cebula cites.

ABSTRACT California's Proposition 13 and Massachusetts'Proposition 2½ attempted to shrink state and local tax burdens by reducing property taxes and limiting future tax growth. Both initially succeeded. However, following a brief lag, those governments made up lost revenues primarily through increased non‐tax fees and charges; within a decade, real per capita revenues and expenditures exceeded their pre‐tax revolt peaks. This development is consistent with the hypothesis that voter‐initiated limits on a subset of revenue sources, intended to reduce state and local tax burdens, succeed temporarily but are then undermined by expansions in other revenue sources.