Suchergebnisse

In the days of the Soviet Union, Georgia was one of the most flourishing Soviet republics due to its protected tea and wine market and its attractive Black Sea resorts. The breakup of the U.S.S.R., the opening by the FSU republics of their borders to broad imports following the "parade of sovereignties," and wars within the country led to a sharp decline in Georgia's economic indicators, but in recent years the situation has begun to improve Nevertheless, living standards in Georgia remain low. Official unemployment is around 13% of the working age population. But independent experts believe that from 2003 to the beginning of 2005 unemployment rose by 20% to around 47% of the working age population. Most large industrial enterprises remain at a standstill or operate at less than full capacity. During the years of independence, over 1 million people -the most employable and active part of the population-have left the country. A significant proportion of Georgia's population subsists, for the most part, on remittances from relatives working abroad. Experts estimate the annual amount of remittances from Georgian "guest workers" living in Russia alone at $1-2 billion. According to an IMF analytical report on the economic prospects of the Middle East and Central Asia, remittances from abroad in 2005 accounted for over 5% of Georgian GDP. The country's Minister of State Kakha Bendukidze estimates this amount at 4% of GDP. In the opinion of analysts, the business environment in Georgia is not conducive to a reduction or elimination of existing investment risks, while the political situation impedes socioeconomic development. Thus, although small and medium enterprises make up 97% of all active companies, their share of Georgia's GNP is only around 10% (compared to 60% in EU countries). The government has taken some steps to improve the country's regulation and auditing systems: health inspectors no longer "cruise" around cafes and restaurants, and it is possible to start a business even without prior registration. Nevertheless, international standards are still a long way off, which is why small business is mostly concentrated in trade.

We all know that the European gas reserves in the North Sea are rapidly depleting. This means that the leading countries of Western Europe and some of the East European countries will have to look for fuel elsewhere. Scared by the Russian-Ukrainian "gas squabbles" they are actively seeking alternative sources. Poland went as far as suggesting that the EU should create an energy pact (patterned on NATO) under which all members would pledge to help those in their ranks that need urgent support. So far, the idea has not gained support. Today, new pipelines from the Caspian area, the Middle East, and North Africa might be built; new marine terminals for tankers carrying liquefied gas from the Persian Gulf are also needed. The commissioned North African gas fields cannot cover Europe's gas needs. The Middle East cannot be described as a stable gas supplier; it also prefers to sell its liquefied gas to Southeast Asia. In this context, the Caspian looks like the best possible option. Practically all the projects look at Central Asia and Azerbaijan as the main gas suppliers; so far little has been said about the projects' possible economic efficiency. It is still much more important to attract attention to one's own country, to raise a "political wave," and to scare away potential rivals. The Europeans are working on the Nabucco project (a gas pipeline that will go from the southern part of the Caspian, via Turkey to Southeast Europe. It will end in Baumgarten in Austria). The plan is far from complete: investments, gas sources, and transportation tariffs have not been discussed, no national companies have been set up for engaging in construction; preliminary works have not yet begun. The "gas projects on paper" seem to pursue purely strategic aims. The West and Russia are fully aware that until the Caspian's legal status has been fixed all talks, let alone agreements, on extracting anything on the Caspian shelf or laying pipelines on its bed will remain futile deliberations measured in megaand giga-bites of political wishful thinking rather than in cubic meters and dollars. This and the fact that the local proven gas reserves will not be enough to fill all the pipelines are successfully ignored.

Obviously, transnational corporations (TNCs) with over 50 percent of world industrial production, over 60 percent of international trade, and nearly 90 percent of foreign direct investments under their control exert considerable influence on the world economy. They have essentially all trade in raw materials under their thumb; Kazakhstan, a country rich in mineral wealth, is also within their range of influence. As an independent state, the republic was not only one of the first in the post-Soviet expanse to attract foreign capital by transferring large enterprises of basic industrial branches to trust management, which allowed subsequent privatization and the setting up of new facilities with 100 percent foreign money, but also relied on intensive mining and extraction as its economic cornerstone. In 1994-1997, the TNCs began their active invasion of Kazakhstan's economy: after supporting "director" or "bureaucratic" privatization, the government placed its stakes on large foreign investments for obvious reasons. Involvement of large TNCs not only placed the country on the economic map of the world and guaranteed a flow of investments, but also ensured domestic stability (due to interest in protecting property rights). This explains the unprecedentedly wide-scale (as compared to other countries with "transition" economies) involvement of large TNCs in the republic's economy. The government expected that foreign corporations' involvement in the local economy through shares and long-term contracts on oil and gas production would contribute to the country's economic upsurge. It was expected that "the new private owners would not only invest in production, but also introduce new marketing and management skills and, especially, new ideas typical of the market economy."

This volume focuses on the analysis and measurement of business cycles in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). Divided into five parts, it begins with an overview of the main concepts and problems involved in monitoring and forecasting business cycles. Then it highlights the role of BRICS in the global economy and explores the interrelatedness of business cycles within BRICS. In turn, part two provides studies on the historical development of business cycles in the individual BRICS countries and describes the driving forces behind those cycles. Parts three and four present national business tendency surveys and composite cyclical indices for real-time monitoring and forecasting of various BRICS economies, while the final part discusses how the lessons learned in the BRICS countries can be used for the analysis of business cycles and their socio-political consequences in other emerging countries.--