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In: Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 596
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In: Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 570
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Working paper
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In: Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 548
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In: 70 Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc 301 (2017)
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In: Stanford Law Review, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (2012)
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In: Philosophy and public affairs, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 266-292
ISSN: 1088-4963
In: Philosophy & public affairs, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 266
ISSN: 0048-3915
In: Philosophy and Public Affairs, Band 35, Heft 3
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From two distinguished experts on election law, an alarming look at how the American presidency could be stolen—by entirely legal means Even in the fast and loose world of the Trump White House, the idea that a couple thousand disorganized protestors storming the U.S. Capitol might actually prevent a presidential succession was farfetched. Yet perfectly legal ways of overturning election results actually do exist, and they would allow a political party to install its own candidate in place of the true winner. Lawrence Lessig and Matthew Seligman work through every option available for subverting a presumptively legitimate result—from vice-presidential intervention to election decertification and beyond. While many strategies would never pass constitutional muster, Lessig and Seligman explain how some might. They expose correctable weaknesses in the system, including one that could be corrected only by the Supreme Court. Any strategy aimed at hacking a presidential election is a threat to democracy. This book is a clarion call to shore up the insecure system for electing the president before American democracy is forever compromised