Suchergebnisse

Most analyses of the judicialization of politics focus on judicial policy-making and rights creation; however when judicialization of politics unfolds in a separation of powers political context courts are also involved in distributing power. The task of power delineation among branches of government is different from policy-making or rights adjudication. Judicializing political disputes about power gives courts the opportunity to alter the balance of institutional power, to create stronger executives (or legislatures) and a stronger (or weaker) role for themselves. To illustrate these points, this article examines how the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal (TC) adjudicated a specific type of separation of powers conflict between the Legislature and the Executive from 1990-2005. The analysis of the TC doctrine overtime highlights how the TC has shifted the balance of power in the policy-making process and augmented its influence within the political system. Adapted from the source document.

Most analyses of the judicialization of politics focus on judicial policy-making and rights creation; however when judicialization of politics unfolds in a separation of powers political context courts are also involved in distributing power. The task of power delineation among branches of government is different from policy-making or rights adjudication. Judicializing political disputes about power gives courts the opportunity to alter the balance of institutional power, to create stronger executives (or legislatures) and a stronger (or weaker) role for themselves. To illustrate these points, this article examines how the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal (TC) adjudicated a specific type of separation of powers conflict between the Legislature and the Executive from 1990-2005. The analysis of the TC doctrine overtime highlights how the TC has shifted the balance of power in the policy-making process and augmented its influence within the political system. (GIGA)

Cover -- Half Title -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- 1 Gendering Constitutions -- Introduction -- Why Constitutional Gender Provisions Matter -- Gendering Constitutions: A Typology -- A Mixed Methods Approach -- Organization of the Book -- References -- 2 Why Constitutions Matter for Gender Equality -- Introduction -- Why Constitutions Matter for Gender Policy and Gender Equality -- Theoretical Expectations -- Enhances the Legitimacy of Rights Claims -- Enables Policy Change -- Provides Legal Tools and Arguments That Facilitate Litigation -- Comparing Constitutions and Gender Equality -- A Database of Constitutional Gender Provisions -- Gender Provisions Across Countries and Across Time -- Building a Typology of Gender in Constitutions -- Methods -- Quantitative Analysis -- Case Studies -- References -- 3 Constitutional Gender Provisions and Equality: Cross-National Evidence -- Introduction -- Gender Provisions and Mid-Range Outcomes -- Gender-Based Violence Provisions -- Reproductive Rights Provisions -- Workplace Protection and Equality Provisions -- Family and Customary Law Provisions -- Multivariate Analysis -- Measuring Gender Equality -- Egalitarian, Maternal, and Gender-Neutral Provisions -- Alternative Explanations and Control Variables -- Women's Mobilization -- Democracy and Constitution Age -- Judicial Independence -- Socio-Economic Development and Population -- Panel Regressions -- Robustness Checks -- Conclusion -- Chapter Appendix -- References -- 4 Gender Provisions, Rights Advocacy, and Policy Outcomes in Chile and Argentina -- Introduction -- Constitutional Provisions and Policy Change-Expectations -- Enhances the Legitimacy of Rights Claims -- Enables Policy Change -- Provides Legal Tools and Arguments -- Comparing Constitutions.