Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article examines policy feedback via economic behavior in the mass public, with a focus on consumption behavior. Do public policies affect the consumption behavior of mass publics and subsequent policymaking processes and outcomes? If so, how? I introduce a policy feedback model of consumption behavior in the mass public. Within this model, I advance a theoretical argument on the consequences of targeted cash assistance policies (TCAPs) for consumer spending behavior and government provision of basic utilities in developing countries. Using a randomized field experiment in Mexico and pre–post analysis, I find that TCAPs boost consumer spending on private access to basic utilities in the short term and reduce government provision of basic utilities in the medium term. The study pushes policy feedback theorists to think beyond the arena of mass politics, and the findings have important implications for social policy and human development in developing countries.

Do conditional cash transfers (CCTs) lead to increased participation in multiple political activities in Latin America? If CCTs contribute to broad political participation, how do CCTs increase participation in a wide variety of political activities? I argue that CCTs boost political participation through resource effects, and that both the cash transfers and the conditionalities play an important role in shaping political activity among beneficiaries. Using an original data set from Mexico and existing survey data from nine Latin American countries, I analyze the relationship between CCTs and political participation and examine the hypothesized pathway. The results support my argument.

AbstractMany children die of easily preventable or treatable diseases in developing countries. What are the relationships between corruption, patronage, and child mortality in low‐ and middle‐income countries? We argue that corruption and patronage affect child mortality outcomes for some causes of death, especially those that are more easily prevented or treated with affordable care. To test our hypotheses, we utilize cross‐national time‐series analysis of under‐five child mortality in developing countries between 1996 and 2016. Our study finds that patronage and corruption increase under‐five child mortality arising from easily preventable childhood diseases, but they have almost no effect on under‐five child mortality caused by more complex illnesses. Our study underscores the need to examine cause‐specific health outcomes rather than overall health outcomes in comparative health analysis, as the ability of governments to address specific health issues depends on the nature of the problems.Related ArticlesIreni‐Saban, Liza. 2013. "Give Me Children or Else I Die: The Politics and Policy of Cross‐Border Reproductive Care." Politics & Policy 41(1): 5–38. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12004.Lagunes, Paul F. 2012. "Corruption's Challenge to Democracy: A Review of the Issues." Politics & Policy 40(5): 802–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00384.x.Tusalem, Rollin F. 2022. "Does Gendered Representation in National Legislatures Promote Substantive Representation and Human Development? Evidence from the Developing World." Politics & Policy 50(6): 1096–137. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12503.