Reaching the climate targets set in the Paris Agreement on climate change requires decarbonizing all parts of the global economy. The electrification of industry processes—and more specifically, electrosynthesis (ES)—is an important decarbonization mechanism. To tap into this mechanism's potential and accelerate the decarbonization of these processes, I argue that public policy needs to perform two tasks. First, energy policy needs to enable the provision of CO(2) emissions-free baseload electricity. Second, innovation policy needs to accelerate cost reductions for ES. Here, I discuss why this is the case, what the challenges are, how policy makers can address them, and how political ambition can be increased.
Reaching the climate targets set in the Paris Agreement on climate change requires decarbonizing all parts of the global economy. The electrification of industry processes—and more specifically, electrosynthesis (ES)—is an important decarbonization mechanism. To tap into this mechanism's potential and accelerate the decarbonization of these processes, I argue that public policy needs to perform two tasks. First, energy policy needs to enable the provision of CO2 emissions-free baseload electricity. Second, innovation policy needs to accelerate cost reductions for ES. Here, I discuss why this is the case, what the challenges are, how policy makers can address them, and how political ambition can be increased. ; ISSN:2589-0042
Despite the prominence of exogenous factors in theories of policy change, the precise mechanisms that link such factors to policy change remain elusive: The effects of exogenous factors on the politics underlying policy change are not sufficiently conceptualized and empirically analyzed. To address this gap, we propose to distinguish between truly exogenous factors and policy outcomes to better understand policy change. Specifically, we combine the Advocacy Coalition Framework with policy feedback theory to conceptualize a complete feedback loop among policy, policy outcomes, and subsequent politics. Aiming at theory‐building, we use policy feedback mechanisms to explain why advocacy coalitions change over time. Empirically, we conduct a longitudinal single case study on policy‐induced technological change in the German energy subsystem, an extreme case of policy outcomes, from 1983 to 2013. First, using discourse network analysis, we identify four patterns of actor movements, explaining coalition decline and growth. Second, using process tracing, we detect four policy feedback mechanisms explaining these four actor movements. With this inductive mixed‐methods approach, we build a conceptual framework in which policy outcomes affect subsequent politics through feedback mechanisms. We develop propositions on how coalition change and feedback mechanisms explain four ideal‐typical trajectories of policy change.
Abstract Effectively addressing grand societal challenges like climate change and environmental degradation requires policy intervention that is not only continuous but also increasing in ambition over time. However, negative feedback could lead to policies being weakened or even discontinued after a while. An important but unresolved policy question, therefore, is whether policies can be deliberately designed to survive (i.e., to "stick") and, ideally, be replaced with more ambitious ones over time (i.e., to "ratchet up"). We bridge policy feedback and policy design scholarship to derive hypotheses on the effects of two policy design features—"intensity" (i.e., a measure of policies' overall design) and "specificity" (i.e., a measure of policies' targeted focus)—on policy (dis-)continuation and ratcheting-up (-down) of ambition. Focusing on policy design, we contribute to the theorization and empirical understanding of endogenous factors behind policy change. We test our hypotheses with an event history dataset of 627 low-carbon energy policies in eight developed countries. Conducting a multilevel survival analysis, we find statistically significant evidence of more intense policies being replaced with less intense ones, i.e., more intense policies lead to ratcheting-down of ambition. We also find that more specific policies are more likely to be replaced with more intense policies, i.e., more specific policies lead to ratcheting-up of ambition. Based on these novel insights, we discuss how policy design can navigate these complex dynamics. In this sense, our approach also contributes to the discussion about the "forward-looking" potential of the policy sciences.
