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"Social ontology, conventionally defined, is not primarily about us. Rather, it is about the social world (or worlds), about social reality (or realities), or about the domain(s) of social facts. Social ontology aims at providing an inventory of the basic kinds of entities that make up the social world(s) - items such as norms, institutions, social practices, status positions, power structures, and artifacts. It is the study of the basic kinds of properties of these entities, and of how the social world exists, how it is constituted, or constructed"--

Collective Intentionality is a relatively new label for a basic social fact: the sharing of attitudes such as intentions, beliefs and emotions. This volume contributes to current research on collective intentionality by pursuing three aims. First, some of the main conceptual problems in the received literature are introduced, and a number of new insights into basic questions in the philosophy of collective intentionality are developed (part 1). Second, examples are given for the use of the analysis of collective intentionality in the theory and philosophy of the social sciences (part 2). Third, it is shown that this line of research opens up new perspectives on classical topics in the history of social philosophy and social science, and that, conversely, an inquiry into the history of ideas can lead to further refinement of our conceptual tools in the analysis of collective intentionality (part 3).

Abstract
Practical reasoning is an agent's capacity to determine her course of behavior on the base of some evaluation of available alternatives. Reasoning is instrumental insofar as an agent decides over available alternatives by aiming to choose the best means to realize her own goals. Reasoning is strategic if the agent assumes that what the best means to realize her own goals is depends on what other agents will do. Strategic reasoning still plays a central role in influential accounts of social action. This paper first argues for the view that purely strategic reasoners are unable to achieve even the most basic and unproblematic forms of mutually beneficent coordination, and then gathers some elements of a richer account of relevant forms of practical reasoning.

In this paper, I distinguish three claims, which I label individual intentional autonomy, individual intentional autarky, and intentional individualism. The autonomy claim is that under normal circumstances, each individual's behavior has to be interpreted as his or her own action. The autarky claim is that the intentional interpretation of an individual's behavior has to bottom out in that individual's own volitions, or pro-attitudes. The individualism claim is weaker, arguing that any interpretation of an individual's behavior has to be given in terms of individual intentional states. I argue that individual intentional autonomy implies neither individual intentional autarky, nor intentional individualism, with which it is usually lumped together. I further argue that this insight is the key to an adequate view of an important class of actions, i.e., plural actions.

Abstract
In this paper it is argued that a) altruism is an inadequate label for human cooperative behavior, and b) an adequate account of cooperation has to depart from the standard economic model of human behavior by taking note of the agents' capacity to see themselves and act as team-members. Contrary to what Fehr et al. seem to think, the main problem of the conceptual limitations of the standard model is not so much the assumption of selfishness but rather the atomistic conception of the individual. A much-neglected question of the theory of cooperation is how the agent's social identity is determined, i.e. how individuals come to think of themselves and act as members of a group. Considering as an example one of Fehr et al.'s third party punishment experiments, I shall argue that the agents' identities (and thus the result of the experiment) are strongly influenced by the way the experiment is presented to the participants, especially by the collectivity-related vocabulary used in the instructions.

Wer verstehen will, was Sozialität ist, kann am Phänomen gemeinsamer Absichten, Empfindungen und Überzeugungen nicht vorbeigehen. Dieses Buch deckt die Denkschranken auf, die einer angemessenen Berücksichtigung dieses Phänomens in der Sozialontologie bisher im Wege gestanden haben. In einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit der gegenwärtigen analytischen Handlungstheorie und anknüpfend an vielversprechende und bislang zu wenig beachtete Analyseansätze in der früheren Phänomenologie und Existentialphilosophie werden zentrale Elemente einer adäquaten Theorie gemeinsamer Intentionalität gesammelt. Dabei stellt sich u. a. heraus, daß unsere Blindheit gegenüber der Struktur gemeinsamer Intentionen selbst ein wesentliches Phänomen unseres gemeinsamen Daseins ist. Dieser Befund wird in einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit dem ökonomischen Verhaltensmodell diskutiert. 'Der Autor zeigt in seinem genau argumentierenden und bemerkenswert elegant geschriebenen Buch, dass es eine ontologische Dimension des 'Zusammenstimmens' gibt, die dafür sorgt, dass kollektives Handeln und sozialer Gemeinsinn auch dann zustande kommen, wenn jeder seinen eigenen Absichten und Zielen folgt.' Ludger Heidbrink in der Neuen Zürcher Zeitung