Suchergebnisse

We investigate how internal distribution motives can interfere with the economic objectives of capital controls. In order to do this, we provide a model showing that elite capture can affect optimal debt repatriations and the management of official reserves under capital controls. Relying on these theoretical insights and a wealth of quantitative and qualitative historical evidence, we study one of history's largest debt repatriations - that of 1930s Germany. We show that the authorities kept private repatriations under strict control, thus avoiding detrimental macroeconomic effects, while allowing discretionary repatriations in order to reap internal political benefits.

One of history's largest repatriations of sovereign and commercial debt occurred in Germany between 1931 and 1939. Our study of the episode finds that German authorities kept private initiatives of debt repatriation under increasingly strict control in order to avoid known detrimental macroeconomic effects, yet allowed the practice on a discretionary basis as a way to reap internal political benefits. The repatriated bonds exhibited a non-negligible and varying spread between their domestic prices and their respective prices on foreign stock markets. We analyze nine years of weekly spreads to argue that the crucial factor for the origination, variation and persistence of the spread was the impact of capital controls on the efficiency of secondary markets. Additionally, we model how internal redistribution motives in the form of elite capture affect socially optimal debt repatriations, merging established results in the literature on debt buybacks with recent research that links the efficiency of secondary markets to sovereign risk. Our analysis offers a comprehensive interpretation of the salient aspects of the historical episode as well as novel insights for several open debates in international macroeconomics. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

We show how elite capture affects optimal debt repatriations and management of official reserves under capital controls, bridging literature on debt buybacks and secondary markets. The model we provide guides our study of one of history's largest debt repatriations -in 1930s Germany. Authorities kept private repatriations under strict control-avoiding detrimental macroeconomic effects- while allowing discretionary repatriations so to reap internal political benefits. German assets exhibited large spreads between their domestic and foreign prices, granting arbitrage profits to those who had forex access. New data reveals that spread dynamics were affected by the impact of capital controls on secondary markets. ; Not Reviewed

We show how elite capture affects optimal debt repatriations and management of official reserves under capital controls, bridging literature on debt buybacks and secondary markets. The model we provide guides our study of one of history's largest debt repatriations -in 1930s Germany. Authorities kept private repatriations under strict control -avoiding detrimental macroeconomic effects- while allowing discretionary repatriations so to reap internal political benefits. German assets exhibited large spreads between their domestic and foreign prices, granting arbitrage profits to those who had forex access. New data reveals that spread dynamics were affected by the impact of capital controls on secondary markets.