Suchergebnisse

Der aktuelle Preisverfall im Europäischen Emissionshandelssystem ist nicht nur eine Folge der gegenwärtigen Wirtschaftskrise. Auch Überlagerungseffekte mit anderen Politikzielen wie der Mindestquote für erneuerbare Energien spielen eine Rolle. Diese Überlagerungseffekte entfalten ihre Wirksamkeit besonders in Phasen niedrigen Wirtschaftswachstums.

This report analyses how anti-carbon leakage measures, i.e. Border Carbon Adjustments (BCA), would interact with domestic and foreign firms' R&D investment. The results of a multi- country multi-sector model with endogenous R&D investment are presented, calibrated with data of major world economies. The model also features endogenous market structure in order to embed the effect of changes in market concentration on innovation incentives. Our analysis shows that endogenous R&D investments have significant effects on carbon leakage rates and also increase the effectiveness of BCA schemes. It also shows that understanding the competition-innovation nexus is crucial for a better design of unilateral climate policies. ; ENTRACTE Project - EU FP7

AbstractWe extend the literature on global supply chains by analyzing if and how unilateral environmental regulation induces offshoring. We develop an analytical model of two‐stage production processes that can be distributed between two countries and investigate unilateral emission pricing and its supplementation with border carbon taxes. In contrast to existing final good models, we are able to show how impacts of regulation differ across the different stages of the supply chain, depending on the interplay of comparative advantages and general equilibrium effects. To get a more comprehensive picture, we subsequently apply a computable general equilibrium model that includes a representation of international supply chains. We find heterogeneous but mostly positive effects of a unilateral carbon emission reduction by the European Union on the degree of vertical specialization of European industries. Border taxes are successful in protecting upstream industries, but with negative side effects for downstream industries.

This paper studies policy instruments that correct insufficient learning-by-doing (LbD) and research and development (R&D) of renewable electricity technologies and insufficient investments in energy efficiency (EE) in the presence of carbon pricing. The theoretical model analysis shows how to re-adjust the first-best in second-best situations, in which one of the policy instruments is restricted. Calibrated to the European power sector, the first-best choice of all instruments reduces the climate policy cost by one third. Feed-in tariffs turn out to be good substitutes for LbD, but not for R&D or EE subsidies.

This paper studies policy instruments that correct insufficient learning-by-doing (LbD) and research and development (R&D) of renewable electricity technologies and insufficient investments in energy efficiency (EE) in the presence of carbon pricing. The theoretical model analysis shows how to re-adjust the first-best in second-best situations, in which one of the policy instruments is restricted. Calibrated to the European power sector, the first-best choice of all instruments reduces the climate policy cost by one third. Feed-in tariffs turn out to be good substitutes for LbD, but not for R&D or EE subsidies.