Suchergebnisse

AbstractPrice gouging laws are designed to protect consumers from skyrocketing prices, but are they beneficial in practice? In this research, we analyze food retailers' response to widespread price gouging litigation for table eggs at the onset of the COVID‐19 pandemic. Our results suggest that price gouging litigation led to a dramatic change in US food retailer behavior, which persisted long after the resolution of many of these legal disputes. Major grocery retail chains responded to price gouging litigation by announcing price freezes on thousands of staple products. By rigidly adhering to pre‐pandemic price levels for eggs, we find that retailer response led to a breakdown in the historic dynamic equilibrium relationship between egg prices and the costs of major inputs. At a time when the cost of egg production increased sharply, we find that retailers chose to reduce their purchases and price promotions for eggs rather than raise prices. This suggests that—in response to price gouging litigation—food retailers are willing to accept empty shelves in lieu of increasing prices.

AbstractIn the midst of a pandemic, falling on one side or the other of the cruel "razor's edge" of the "essential" and "nonessential" labor distinction can mean the difference between infection versus safety and, on the other hand, continued earnings versus unemployment. This article synthesizes relevant research from a variety of disciplines to explore the implications of the essentiality distinction as a "second‐best" policy instrument. We identify ways to improve the equity and efficiency of the distinction as a second‐best policy tool and consider potential ways to look beyond essentialness for future economic policy responses to pandemics.

AbstractUnder the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement, Mexican sugar producers were ultimately granted free access to the US sugar market, while all other suppliers, including US refiners, were subject to supply quotas. Following a surge in imports of Mexican sugar, the American Sugar Coalition initiated anti‐dumping and countervailing duty (ADCVD) proceedings against Mexico in early 2014. In December 2014, the ADCVD cases were halted as a result of two suspension agreements negotiated between the US and Mexico. This paper contributes to a small number of empirical studies that have estimated the impact of suspension agreements. We measure the impacts of the ADCVD filings and the suspension agreements on US domestic raw and refined prices, the raw‐to‐refined margin and the quantity and composition of sugar imports from Mexico. Results suggest US raw sugar prices increased by 3¢ per lb. (14%) under ADCVD proceedings, equivalent to an ad valorem tariff between 40% and 50%, while the suspension agreements increased US raw sugar prices by 5¢ (70% tariff equivalent). US refined sugar prices increased by similar amounts under the ADCVD proceedings and the suspension agreements (4.5¢ per lb.). Ultimately, both the ADCVD proceedings and the suspension agreements significantly reduced sugar imports from Mexico. US sugar refiner economic welfare hinges critically on the quantity and composition of raw sugar imports. As such, refiner revenue, following the ADCVD filings and suspension agreements, is estimated to have declined by 16%, relative to a free trade environment.

AbstractThis paper investigates the extent to which ad hoc farm payments made under the Market Facilitation Program (MFP) and the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) affected voting patterns in the 2020 Presidential Election. MFP and CFAP payments were historically unique not only in terms of their magnitude, but also because they were authorized almost entirely by the incumbent Administration of President Donald Trump without direct Congressional authorization or appropriation. Our results indicate that these payments did influence county‐level voting outcomes. The observed response is driven almost exclusively by increased turnout among Trump supporters—we do not observe evidence that ad hoc payments generated widespread "vote switching" away from the Democratic or third‐party candidates and toward Trump. We find the MFP and CFAP programs generated 677,512 votes for Republican candidate Trump in the 2020 Presidential Election with an estimated cost‐per‐vote‐gained of $66,124. These votes induced by ad hoc farm payments were insufficient to change electoral college outcomes in any U.S. state.