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By measuring U.S. term limits dichotomously, investigators ignore the vast differences among laws limiting state legislative service. Furthermore, this measurement problem increases the risk of false negatives and confounds the effects of term limits with those of the citizen initiative. To address this, I propose two sets of continuous measures of term-limitedness. The first set compares mandated turnover after term limits to turnover in the 1980s, the decade before term limits began sweeping elected officials from office. A second set adjusts the first set to reflect the potential for legislators to cycle repeatedly between legislative chambers when only their consecutive years of service are limited. These continuous measures outperformed a dichotomous designation of term limits in two tests, suggesting that the proposed measures can reduce the risk of false negatives about term limits in U.S. multi-state research and that they are more robust in the face of confounding effects from the citizen initiative. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractBy measuring U.S. term limits dichotomously, investigators ignore the vast differences among laws limiting state legislative service. Furthermore, this measurement problem increases the risk of false negatives and confounds the effects of term limits with those of the citizen initiative. To address this, I propose two sets of continuous measures of term-limitedness. The first set compares mandated turnover after term limits to turnover in the 1980s, the decade before term limits began sweeping elected officials from office. A second set adjusts the first set to reflect the potential for legislators to cycle repeatedly between legislative chambers when only their consecutive years of service are limited. These continuous measures outperformed a dichotomous designation of term limits in two tests, suggesting that the proposed measures can reduce the risk of false negatives about term limits in U.S. multi-state research and that they are more robust in the face of confounding effects from the citizen initiative.

What is the relationship between program implementation and bureaucratic entrepreneurship? The work presented here, based on a comparative case study of three public programs, integrates both implementation and entrepreneurship into a larger framework encompassing patterns of program development. Additionally, it describes a pattern of bureaucratic entrepreneurship called bottom-up entrepreneurship to indicate that people working at lower levels of the system developed the programs. Comparing patterns of entrepreneurship with patterns described in the implementation literature suggests two critical dimensions of program development. These dimensions involve efforts to gain acceptance among actors engaging in the action (lower level acceptance) and efforts to gain acceptance from actors with the authority to provide funding and officially adopt new programs (upper level acceptance). The author uses these two factors to construct a program development framework that both integrates and distinguishes between entrepreneurship and implementation.

"Today, 70 percent of the American public supports reforms that would limit the number of terms a state legislator may serve, and the advocacy group U.S. Term Limits promotes this reform at all levels of government. But are advocates correct that term limits ensure citizens dedicated to the common good--rather than self-serving career politicians--run government? Or does the enforced high rate of turnover undermine the legislature's ability to function? In Implementing Term Limits, Marjorie Sarbaugh-Thompson and Lyke Thompson bring thirteen years of intensive research and 460 interviews to assess changes since Michigan's implementation of term limits in 1993 and explore their implications. Paying special attention to term limits' institutional effects, they also consider legislative representation, political accountability, and the role of the bureaucracy and interest groups in state legislatures. Their thorough study suggests that legislators are less accessible to officials and that there is a larger gap between legislators and their voters. Moreover, legislators become much more politically ambitious after term limits and spend more time on political activities. The selection of top chamber leaders is complicated by newcomers' lack of knowledge about and experience working with the leaders they elect before being sworn in. As a result, term limits in Michigan fail to deliver on many of the "good government" promises that appeal to citizens. Implementing Term Limits makes a unique and valuable contribution to the debate over the best means by which to obtain truly democratic institutions"--

When people use electronic mail, they can communicate even when they are not physically or temporally proximate. Thus, it is not surprising that most studies report that the use of electronic mail increases organizational communication. In the study presented here, overall organizational communication declined as use of electronic mail increased. As we probed the nature of this decline, we discovered that much of the lost communication was greetings. This raises questions about the role that greetings, and other forms of casual conversation, play in an organization. To organize our insights about this topic we formulate a two-by-two communication matrix based on presence versus absence and availability versus unavailability. Prior research focuses on the ways being present and available and being absent but available through electronic mail affect the performance of specific communication tasks. Using our typology, we direct attention to the role of casual conversation in presence availability and to the parts that presence unavailability and absence unavailability can play in organizational communication.

Models of public policy implementation proliferated during the 1970s and 1980s. We argue that these models should be robust across different time periods and should accurately postdict and explain the outcomes known to have occurred. This article looks at two models of policy implementation, one developed by Mazmanian and Sabatier and another developed by Nakwnura and Smallwood. Robustness and explanatory ability of these models are assessed using a historical case study of the first national child labor law. This demonstrates the advantages of a historical perspective on policy implementation. Looking at policy across time raises questions about current models of implementation.

AbstractObjectiveThis study explores why state legislators think some issues are difficult and where they turn for help with these issues.MethodsWe use content analysis of legislators' interview responses to identify sources of difficulty that arose during committee deliberations.ResultsMany legislators say that issues are difficult because of committee and caucus politics, technical information, interest group pressure, jurisdictional competition, and budget constraints. We find few associations between sources of difficulty and legislator characteristics or institutional context. Mundane issues are often seen as difficult, with culture war issues rarely mentioned.Using cluster analysis, we identify five major categories of issue difficulty. We find that legislators grapple with these categories of difficulty by relying on interest groups, partisan staff, and committee members rather than on caucus leaders, the governor, or their voters.ConclusionThese findings contribute to our understanding of impediments to policy making that legislators navigate in legislative committees.

This article reviews & analyzes the social construction of legitimacy after the election through the first weeks of George W. Bush's presidency. The 2000 presidential election illustrates the use of the traditional gateways & rituals to confer political authority after a contested election. Bertrand de Jouvenal's (1957) metaphorical designations of political authority as rex & dux, the legitimator & the leader, explain the intricate rituals that authorize both functions. Gateways within the rituals are achieved through actions of the press, the losing candidate, the winner, & other actors, including states, the electoral college, political parties, & Congress. Transition rituals include Crowning the Prince, Reincarnating rex for transition; Rex Ascendant for commemoration of the new leader; Burying Rex for commemorating the departed one; & Displaying Dux for dramatizing new policies. The Bush administration enacted these rituals, but until September 11 (2001), it is not clear that the enactments possessed the resiliency needed for effective leadership. 4 Tables, 1 Figure. L. A. Hoffman