Uncertain Litigation and Liability Insurance
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 218
ISSN: 1756-2171
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In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 218
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: Review of Pacific Basin financial markets and policies: RPBFMP
The 32nd Annual Conference on Pacific Basin Finance, Economics, Accounting, and Management was held at Rutgers University, USA on August 29 and 30, 2024. The first conference was held at Rutgers University in 1993. Since then, the conference has been held in Hong Kong (1994, 1998), Taiwan (1995, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2011, 2016, 2019, 2020, 2022, 2023), Rutgers (1996, 2001, 2005, 2012, 2018, 2021), Singapore (1997, 2002, 2017), Bangkok (2000, 2004, 2009), Vietnam (2007, 2015), Australia (2008, 2013), China (2010), Japan (2014). The program directors of the conference were Cheng-Few Lee and Bharat Sarath, Rutgers University, USA.
In: Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, Band 25, Heft 2
ISSN: 1793-6705
In: Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 1950014
ISSN: 1793-6705
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 150
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: Review of Pacific Basin financial markets and policies: RPBFMP
This study examines small business loans and default rates using a unique proprietary dataset from a private bank in China. As Chinese regulations preclude differential interest rates, alternative tools such as auditing, relationship length, and group lending are used to mitigate default risk. Although the audit process for small businesses in China is not of high quality compared to international standards, they still lower default rates as borrowers use audits as a positive signal of the firms' likelihood of success. We also find that a longer relationship length reduces default risk as it likely increases the bank's soft information regarding borrowers. Group lending is another popular mechanism for reducing default rates, especially for microfinance loans. While this strategy's risk-sharing and monitoring aspects have been widely analyzed, we focus on a free rider problem using a game-theoretic model that suggests the optimal group size may be smaller than conventional wisdom suggests and empirically confirm this hypothesis.
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