Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Individuals in low-income countries often contribute significantly to financing local public goods through informal taxation. However, there is limited understanding of how informal revenue generation relates to formal tax and governing institutions. We explore the relationship between informal revenue generation, public finance, and the state in the Gedo region in south-central Somalia, relying on original data from surveys with 2,300 households and 117 community leaders. Our evidence shows that informal revenue generation by non-armed actors in Gedo is prevalent, with informal payments deeply embedded within clan-based and Islamic institutions and rooted in a long history of decentralized political authority and self-reliance in the region. We argue that in such a context, rather than explaining how or why things 'work' outside of the state, it may be more relevant and valuable to consider decentralized non-state public authority as the default referent, with a need only to explain the puzzle of pockets of state effectiveness. Governance largely operates outside the state, with citizens playing a pivotal role in directly financing local governance institutions and public goods provision. These findings have important implications for our understanding of statehood and public finance in contexts of weak formal institutions.

AbstractCommunity contributions are often required as part of community‐driven development programs, with contributions encouraged through matching grants. However, little remains known about the impact of matching grants or the implications of requiring community contributions—also known as informal taxation. We explore this research gap through a randomized control trial of a matching grant program in Gedo region in south‐central Somalia. We find that matching grants can increase informal taxation and serve as an effective means of delivering public goods. Moreover, we find that the program strengthened local government legitimacy, despite the local government playing no direct role in the program. These findings deepen our understanding of how matching grants may contribute to community‐driven development in a context of weak institutional capacity, while pointing to potential complementarities between state and non‐state actors in governance and service provision, formal and informal institutions, and formal and informal taxation.

AbstractWe investigate whether social protection programs can increase participation in community‐driven development programs and examine how this affects state‐citizen relations. Using a randomized controlled trial in south‐central Somalia, we study the impacts of one‐time unconditional cash transfers to vulnerable households that were specifically designed to encourage participation in community development. While the cash transfer is relatively small as a share of annual household expenditure, it is more than sufficient to cover households' anticipated community development contributions. The transfers were funded by an NGO but delivered through state institutions. We collect survey data before and after the intervention with almost 600 individuals eligible to receive cash transfers. We find no substantial differences in participation in community development projects for cash transfer recipient households relative to non‐recipient households. However, we do find positive impacts of the cash transfers on citizen perceptions of clan elders and the local government. Our findings suggest that relatively small social protection interventions may face challenges in increasing vulnerable households' participation in community development and decision‐making, while also highlighting potential positive spillover effects for state‐citizen relations and beliefs about the capacity of local institutions where states institutions are involved in program delivery, even if they do not finance the program.