Suchergebnisse

This paper attempts to explain the emergence and development of para-governmental organizations (bonyads) in Iran and demonstrate their contradictory position in the Iranian political economy. These organizations represent the dual power structure in Iran which reinforces the financial authority of religious leaders without accountability. By analyzing the functions of these organizations, the paper sets out to probe their economic policies in line with the government's populist macroeconomic policies. The paper demonstrates the adverse effects of these organizations on political development and economic reforms in the post-Khomeini era when the struggle for accountability soared.

This paper undertakes a political analysis of economic policy in Iran in the post-1979 period, and examines a specific kind of populist economics within the legacy of the rentier state as a result of the emergence of charismatic political authority. It discusses the implications of charismatic authority which led to the implementation of populist economics, and which coincided with economic and political instability during the reign of Ayatollah Khumaini and afterward when his successor was involved in a crisis of routinisation of charismatic legitimacy. (DSE/DÜI)