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In this paper it is argued that the music business should be regarded as an activity trading in information. The paper begins with a review of key themes in the conceptualisation of the music industry within the cultural economies tradition. These are the tensions between creativity and commerce and between global and local processes, and the characterisation of the industry in the terms of the flexible specialisation and reflexive accumulation theses. It is then suggested that these debates have downplayed a key characteristic of the contemporary music industry, its involvement with the creation, production, and distribution of information. The emergence of a global music business over the past decade is documented and analysed by means of this framework. Subsequently, two aspects of the integration processes taking place in the music industry are considered in terms of their relationship to the information economy: copyright protection and branding, and competition between producers of information storage and retrieval devices. The paper concludes that interpreting music as an information industry sheds new light on the music business, and points to important questions for further research within the information economy literature.

Industrial policy of the European Community (EC) shifted in emphasis towards a neoliberal approach in the late 1980s as one part of moves towards completion of the single internal market by 1992. Intervention by national governments was also to be curtailed (in theory at least) on the grounds that it would be contrary to fair competition and free trade. There is mounting evidence, however, that European industry is increasingly falling behind its main rivals based in the USA and Japan. This poses a sharp challenge for the future of companies in certain key sectors, and for the places and regions dependent on employment in those industries. These issues of industrial strategy and regional development are explored in this paper. First, the change which took place in EC industrial policy from the limited but deliberately interventionist stance of the early 1980s to a much more strongly market-led approach by the early 1990s is outlined. The implications of such free-market measures for the energy sector, in terms of security-of-supply considerations are identified, and these measures are compared with the difficulty experienced in formulating a response to the challenge of global competition in another key sector, automobile production. The uneven regional impacts of such changes are then considered, and the inadequacy, even in its own terms, of present EC regional policy is indicated. Finally, the emergent strategic deficit in EC industrial policy, the regional dilemma associated with the '1992' proposals, and the potential scope for alternative policy directions are addressed.

Two processes figured prominently on the European Community's policymaking agenda during the 1980s and into the early 1990s. These were the single internal market programme, and the economic challenge from Japan. The automobile industry was particularly closely involved in these, because of the extent of Japanese exports and direct foreign investment in the sector, and the range of national state interventions, most of which ran contrary to the '1992' programme. In this paper therefore the issues which underpin the role of the industry in the drive to create a single internal market and to respond to the expansion of 'transplant' assembly capacity are considered first. The policies which have been adopted by the EC in this context are then examined, and the author goes on to identify the limitations upon the policies which have emerged. The paper concludes with reflection on the evident tensions between national state policies and those of the EC and argues that (partly because of these) the political debate has excessively concentrated upon the strategies of vehicle assemblers. This is unfortunate because it obscures the deeper implications of change for the automotive components industry where, it is suggested, there is greater scope for a more effective EC policy response.

AS ONE EXPRESSION OF CONTINUING ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE DEEP OVERPRODUCTION CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN STEEL INDUSTRY, A CRISIS EVIDENT SINCE THE MID1970S, THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN CRUDE STEEL PRODUCTION CAPACITY ENTAILING A SERIES OF WORKS CLOSURES IN AREAS PREVIOUSLY DEPENDENT UPON THE INDUSTRY AS THE MAIN SOURCE OF EMPLOYMENT. IN MANY SUCH THREATENED LOCALITIES ANTI-CLOSURE CAMPAIGNS HAVE DEVELOPED ON A VARIETY OF CLASS BASES AN SPATIAL FOUNDATIONS. IN PARTICULAR, THE CURRENT ANALYSIS FOCUSES ON THREE SUCH CAMPAIGNS WITHIN THE BRITISH STEEL CORPORATION (BSC): THE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF CONSETT STEELWORKS, COUNTY DURHAM IN 1980; THE (TO-DATE) SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE OF THE RAVENSCRAIG WORKS IN SCOTLAND IN 1982; AND THE MORE LIMITED DEFENCE OF THE SOUTH TEESSIDE WORKS IN 1982/3. THESE CAMPAIGNS, IT IS ARGUED, MUST BE CONSIDERED NOT AS A REACTION TO A PRE-GIVEN DECISION BY CAPITAL, BUT RATHER AS ONE MOMENT IN A FAR BROADER RESTRUCTURING PROCESS, ENTAILING CONSIDERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CLASS RELATIONS PROPERLY SPECIFIED WITH RESPECT TO PLACE. THIS IN TURN IS OF CRUCIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR A MARXIST ANALYSIS OF THE STATE IN THAT WHEREAS SUCH AN ANALYSIS IS BY DEFINITION GROUNDED IN THE CLASS NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY CAPITALIST SOCIETY, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER ALSO FROM THE OUTSET THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PLACE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE NATURE OF THE STATE. THIS IS DEMONSTRATED THROUGH THE ANALYSIS OF PARTICULAR CAMPAIGNS. IN PAPY: 1984

It is common practice to associate recommendations for program improvement with evaluation reports. In this article, several classes of recommendations are identified, and aspects of one class are explored in some detail. Consideration is given to certain logical, methodological, and practical issues relating to the derivation of recommendations that specify remedial actions. It is argued that formulating sets of such recommendations generally takes place in environments characterized by indeterminacy, a point that is not sufficiently recognized. The conclusion is reached that evaluation and radical program redesign probably ought to be kept separate.

Suppose that we wish to use several methods to obtain data from several sources for a program evaluation. Because not all data are equally valuable and because the costs of collection vary from method to method, the question arises as to whether it is possible to maximize information yield for a fixed, limited budget. How this problem was structured and solved for a particular program evaluation is described in this article. The approach, which uses a mathematical technique known as linear programming, is easily generalized to other program evaluations.