Suchergebnisse

Many scholars on Malaysia have recognized that Salafism-Wahhabism has penetrated substantially into the countr's political and social life. The southern state of Johor has always been considered, and remains, the bastion of kaum tua, with its religious institutions dominated by ulama (religious scholars) who are traditionalist in character but tolerant of religious practices that are infused with local culture and mysticism. These scholars have also tended to maintain conservative attitudes on gender issues, inter-religious relations, and intra-faith differences. The Sultan of Johor appoints the Mufti whose primary role is to issue fatwas (religious rulings) and be the ex-officio of the Johor Islamic Religious Council, the highest Islamic body in the state. Johor's Muftis are dominantly political quietists, and loyal to the ruling family. Occasional interventions by the Sultan of Johor in the religious sphere have proved crucial in ensuring that the state maintains its Malay character. The Sultan also acts to protect the state's religious institutions from encroachment by the federal government.

Frontmatter -- FOREWORD -- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- TRADITIONALISM, MODERNISM, AND SALAFI-WAHHABISM -- ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN BATAM -- BATAM MUSLIMS AND TRADITIONALISTS -- THE SINGAPORE DIMENSION -- CONCLUSION: EXCLUSIVISM AND TRADITIONALISM -- REFERENCES

Abstract
This article examines the position of the Malay religious elite towards the idea of women as leaders. Based on an analysis of the writings and sermons of a sample of the religious elite, the article concludes that they continue to be of the view that gender roles in modern society are 'fixed', 'divine', and 'unquestionable'. By exploring Mohammed Arkoun's concept of the 'unthinkable', I argue that the notion that women are unfit for top political leadership positions, by virtue of their gender, results from a parochial attitude towards traditions relating to women's role in society and from a general failure to re-evaluate traditions in the light of the modern-day context. By traditions here, I refer not only to the hadiths (recorded sayings of the Prophet Mohammad), but also compilations of Qurʾanic exegesis (tafsīr) and juristic opinions (fatāwā, s. fatwa) passed down from one generation to another in the last 1,400 years of Islamic history. The article also explores how the religious elite's views of gender equality might be reformed—it suggests that they need to be challenged with alternative discourses in order to transform their attitude towards religious sources from one that is unquestioning to one that is more questioning.

After the fall of the New Order in 1998, the Ulama Council of Indonesia (MUI) has been in the limelight for many of its controversial and conservative fatwa (legal opinions). Formed in 1975 by President Suharto, MUI was intended to serve as an institution to manage and discipline dissent, challenges and defiance by grassroots organisations. However, recent writings point to its changing character: Its fatwas are becoming more conservative; it is more assertive and powerful; and its fatwas, particularly the 2005 SIPILIS (anti-secularism, pluralism and liberalism), are deemed as contributing to violence towards minorities. This article reassess the scholarly conclusions and media reports made about the relationship between MUI, the Indonesian state and society. Examining MUI's attempt to define public morality as a case study, particularly its role in the 2008 pornography bill and efforts to "moralise" entertainment, the article argues that MUI is internally fragmented and weak.

Indonesia is the most populous Muslim country in the world, with 87.18 per cent of its 260 million population embracing the Islamic faith. However, Indonesia is neither an Islamic state nor a secular one. It adopts Pancasila as the state ideology but has a Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) overseeing six official religions. MORA has its genesis in Dutch colonial rule (1602-1942). It was strengthened during the Japanese occupation (1942-45) and then sustained by the post-independence Indonesia government (after 1945). The decision to keep MORA was to compensate those who had aspired for the enactment of the Jakarta Charter in the era of Sukarno but failed. MORA has always been the arena for contestation between the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the modernist Muhammadiyah. Both organizations eye not only the minister post, or leadership positions in the bureaucracy, but also lower ranking positions. This article examines how MORA has been managed under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) from 2014 till the present. It highlights similarities and differences in Jokowi's control of the influential ministry compared to his predecessors. In 2014, even though Jokowi was elected on a reform agenda, he left MORA untouched. After the 2019 election, Jokowi appointed Fachrul Razi, a retired general as Minister of Religious Affairs, departing from past practices of naming a religious scholar (ulama) or a religiously trained person (santri) to that position. This demonstrates a wish on the part of the President to shake up the ministry and to exert control over the institution. This decision, however, has alienated core supporters in NU who helped him get re-elected in 2019.

"The Malay/Muslim community is an integral part of the formative years of modern Singapore. The Singapore Malay/Muslim community comprises approximately 13% of Singapore's population of about 5.5 million people. More than 90% of Singaporean Muslims are Malays while the remaining are Indians, Arabs, Chinese and members of other ethnic groups. This book highlights the progress of the community, its contributions, and also the challenges for the last 50 years since 1965"--

Chin, J.: The 2015 Singapore general elections (GE): Lee Kuan Yew's last hurrah? - S. [113]-117