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The connections between emotion and rationality are reexamined. Historically, Plato's doctrine of the tripartite soul has established the preconception of a strict separation of emotion/passion from cognition/rationality, encouraging the biased perception that emotions are inherently irrational. To examine whether emotions can be rational, one must first examine the various meanings of rationality as developed in philosophy, psychology and the social and economic sciences. In this article, three forms of rationality are distinguished, and it is suggested that they can act as criteria to judge the rationality of emotions. Furthermore, before examining the possible relationships between emotion and rationality, the concept of emotion needs a more precise definition. A convergent definition of emotion is proposed in the form of a componential model that is based on an appraisal mechanism that produces tendencies for action to deal rapidly with important and urgent events in an individual's life. It is demonstrated that emotions can be more or less correct or appropriate depending on the accuracy or realism of the underlying appraisal, the appropriateness of the response pattern and the efficacy of the emotion regulation. Considered in the framework of this componential model, it is suggested that emotions can be assessed as to whether, in a particular situation, they are adaptive (functional), based on well-grounded, accurate inference from available information and considered as reasonable reactions by others. Emotions can be considered rational when they fulfill at least one of these three criteria of rationality.

Defining "emotion" is a notorious problem. Without consensual conceptualization and operationalization of exactly what phenomenon is to be studied, progress in theory and research is difficult to achieve and fruitless debates are likely to proliferate. A particularly unfortunate example is William James's asking the question "What is an emotion?" when he really meant "feeling", a misnomer that started a debate which is still ongoing, more than a century later. This contribution attempts to sensitize researchers in the social and behavioral sciences to the importance of definitional issues and their consequences for distinguishing related but fundamentally different affective processes, states, and traits. Links between scientific and folk concepts of emotion are explored and ways to measure emotion and its components are discussed.

While the emotion mechanism is generally considered to be evolutionarily continuous, suggesting a certain degree of universality of emotional responding, there is evidence that emotional experience may differ across cultures and historical periods. This article extrapolates potential changes in future emotional experiences that can be expected to be caused by rapid social and technological change. Specifically, four issues are discussed: (1) the effect of social change on emotions that are strongly tied to dominant values, norms, goals, and self-ideals, like shame, guilt, contempt, and anger; (2) the effects of the use of emotion by the mass media on emotional experience and emotion socialization; (3) the effects of information technology on emotion expression and regulation; and (4) the possibility of producing artificial emotions in autonomous agents (robots). Special emphasis is placed on the class of emotions, defined here as "commotions", that are produced by observing affect in others.