The optimal policy in the provision of public inputs: to what extent do technology, taxation and preferences matter?
In: Journal of economic policy reform, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 259-271
ISSN: 1748-7889
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In: Journal of economic policy reform, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 259-271
ISSN: 1748-7889
In: Información comercial española: revista de economía ; ICE, Heft 917
ISSN: 2340-8790
MACRO
La Agenda 2030 para el Desarrollo Sostenible, aprobada en 2015 por la ONU, constituye un ejemplo exitoso sobre cómo un consenso político internacional respecto a logros deseables en el medio/largo plazo (herederos de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio) se puede concretar en unos objetivos concretos y cuantificables. En concreto, se fijan 17 Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS, en adelante) que incluyen asuntos tan relevantes como la sostenibilidad ambiental, la reducción de la pobreza y las desigualdades o una mayor eficiencia energética y productiva. Este trabajo aspira a estudiar la contribución de la fiscalidad de la Unión Europea a la consecución de dichos objetivos en el periodo 2005-2017.
Do public sector wages exert presures on private sector wages, or has private sector a leadership role in wage setting?. This paper tries to isolate the pure signalling effect that one sector might exert on the other by controlling for other determinants of wages (prices, productivity, institutions) for the main euro area economies (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) and the periods 1980-2007 and 1991-2007. It exploits avilable quarterly information not yet used in the literature, and combine different data sources in the framework of mixedfrecuencies time series models. The quarterly frequency of our data allows us to check the existence of strong evidence of public wages' leadership, either in conjunction with bidirectional links from the private sector (Germany and Spain) or pure public wage leadership (France in the sample 1991-2007, Italy for within-the-year linkages).
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This study analyses the composition and main determinants of spending dynamics in selected euro area countries between 1999 and 2013. To assess the stance of public spending policies we use the indicators developed in Hauptmeier et al. (2011). Our results indicate that the overall expansionary expenditure stance in 1999-2009 was mainly driven by public consumption. Transfers and subsidies on the other hand were mostly expansionary after 2008 while public investment had boomed just before the crisis and turned restrictive during the crisis. The overall policy stance turned restrictive in 2010 and strongly so in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Most consolidation efforts focussed on public investment and on public consumption and while transfers and subsidies were largely spared. Our econometric analysis, which covers the 2000-2013 period, shows a significantly pro-cyclical stance of public consumption which was driving overall spending dynamics. The degree of spending expansion tends to be negatively affected by the size of government debt and the presence of effective fiscal rules. On the other hand, EMU-related interest savings coincided with an expansionary expenditure stance. Revenue windfalls and shortfalls exerted a significant effect on government investment spending.
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In: http://hdl.handle.net/10272/16506
Public sector bureaucracies are key players in advanced economies, as in the case of European Union countries, for the smooth functioning of the roles assigned to the governments (to provide welfare state services and benefits, public infrastructures, and to design the legal and economic institutional framework). From this perspective, a proper functioning of bureaucratic bodies is crucial for potential growth. Thus, cross-country differences in the quality of bureaucracies can explain differences in economic growth among them. Accordingly, the operation of self-interested bureaucracies can lead to inappropriate fiscal policies, regulatory capture, and labor market misallocation, damaging incentives and causing large efficiency costs. The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we review the extant literature, focusing on the main channels of the bureaucracy-growth relationship. And secondly, we provide an empirical exercise that illustrates the links between bureaucratic/institutional quality and economic growth ; Las burocracias del sector público son actores clave en las economías avanzadas, como en el caso de los países de la Unión Europea, para el buen funcionamiento de los papeles asignados a los gobiernos (proporcionar servicios y prestaciones del Estado de Bienestar, infraestructuras públicas y diseño del marco jurídico y económico institucional). Desde esta perspectiva, el buen funcionamiento de la burocracia pública es crucial para el crecimiento potencial. Por lo tanto, las diferencias entre países en la calidad de las burocracias pueden explicar las diferencias en el crecimiento económico. En consecuencia, la existencia de "burocracias con intereses propios" puede llevar a políticas fiscales inadecuadas, a la captura regulatoria o al mal funcionamiento del mercado laboral, dañando los incentivos y generando importantes costes de eficiencia. Dos son los objetivos de este artículo. En primer lugar, revisamos la literatura existente, centrándonos en los principales canales de la relación entre burocracia y crecimiento. Y en segundo, ofrecemos un ejercicio empírico que ilustra los vínculos entre la calidad burocrática/institucional y el crecimiento económico
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Public sector bureaucracies are key players in modern advanced economies, in particular for the smooth functioning of the roles assigned to the government sector, such as the provision and organization of welfare state services, and the implementation of the (economic) institutional framework, including as regards the tax code and the guarantees of legal certainty for economic agents. From this perspective, a proper functioning of bureaucratic bodies is crucial for potential growth. Thus, cross-country differences in the quality of bureaucracies can explain, to a large extent, differences in economic growth among them. The operation of self-interested bureaucracies, insofar as their objective function differs from the one of the benevolent social planner (government), can lead to regulatory capture, damaging efficiency and economic incentives, labor market misallocation, and inefficient fiscal policies. In this paper, first, we engage in a thorough review of the extant literature, framing the discussion of the main channels by means of a small-scale dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model. Second, we provide an empirical exercise that illustrates the links between bureaucratic/institutional quality and economic growth. ; Las burocracias del sector público son actores clave en las economías avanzadas, como en el caso de los países de la Unión Europea, para el buen funcionamiento de los papeles asignados a los gobiernos (proporcionar servicios y prestaciones del Estado de Bienestar, infraestructuras públicas y diseño del marco jurídico y económico institucional). Desde esta perspectiva, el buen funcionamiento de la burocracia pública es crucial para el crecimiento potencial. Por lo tanto, las diferencias entre países en la calidad de las burocracias pueden explicar las diferencias en el crecimiento económico. En consecuencia, la existencia de "burocracias con intereses propios" puede llevar a políticas fiscales inadecuadas, a la captura regulatoria o al mal funcionamiento del mercado laboral, dañando los ...
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In: https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/54815/1/WP01-19.pdf
Efficient use of public resources is clearly a relevant issue to be studied from several points of view. Among others, it accounts for a significant share of the total economy activity and it deals with non market oriented activities. In Spain, the regional level is particularly relevant due to the progressive decentralization during the 200s of key public policies constituting the welfare state (as education, health, etc.). Consequently,it increased notably their financing needs but affecting asymmetrically because of the important differences in their fiscal capacity. Moreover, they mostly share (15 of 17) a common financing system in which an efficient use of resources is assumed but not evaluated. Our results show that normally a few of the regions tend to be the top performers, but there no regions performing poorly in every aspect. It is also worth noting that no dramatic changes can be seen in terms both of expenditure and performance during the recent Great Recession.
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In: Estado del bienestar : sostenibilidad y reformas. XX Encuentro Economía Pública (2013), p 1-11
We estimate the probability of public sector leadership – defined as Granger causality from public to private sector wages – in a pool of 18 OECD countries as a function of countries' institutional features. We find that public-private sector causality results are quite heterogeneous across countries. So, we investigate whether this is related to differences in labor and product market institutions, and notably wage-setting institutions, across countries. Government involvement in collective bargaining, bargaining centralization and collective bargaining systems with predominant regional levels' systems are positively correlated with the probability of finding public wage leadership. Among the factors that reduce its probability we can underline the impact of globalization and a level of collective bargaining closer to the company one.
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En este trabajo presentamos una herramienta para el seguimiento en tiempo real de la ejecución presupuestaria de las Administraciones Públicas en España. La herramienta incorpora un conjunto amplio de modelos estadísticos, con diferentes niveles de agregación entre partidas presupuestarias y subsectores de las Administraciones Públicas, que permiten procesar de manera efi ciente la sustancial información mensual y trimestral publicada actualmente por las autoridades estadísticas en España. La principal utilidad de la herramienta es complementar el análisis habitualmente realizado para detectar de manera anticipada posibles riesgos de desviación con respecto a los objetivos fi scales ofi ciales ; In this paper we develop a comprehensive short-term fiscal forecasting system of use for the real-time monitoring of the Spanish government's borrowing requirement. Spain has been at the centre of the recent European sovereign debt crisis, not least because of sizeable failures in meeting public defi cit targets. The system comprises a suite of models, with different levels of disaggregation (bottom-up vs top-down ; general government vs sub-sectors), which are suitable for the automatic processing of the large amount of monthly/quarterly fi scal data currently published by the Spanish statistical authorities. Our tools are instrumental in the ex-ante detection of risks to offi cial projections, and can thus help reduce the ex-post reputational costs of budgetary slippage. On the basis of our results, we discuss how offi cial monitoring bodies could expand, on one hand, their toolkit to evaluate regular adherence to targets (moving beyond a legalistic approach) and, on the other, their communication policies as regards sources of risks to (ex-ante) compliance with budgetary targets
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In this paper we develop a comprehensive short-term fiscal forecasting system, useful for real-time monitoring of government's borrowing requirement in Spain, a country that has been at the center of the recent European sovereign debt crisis, not least because of sizeable failures to meet public deficit targets. The system is made of a suite of models, with different levels of disaggregation (bottom-up vs top-down; general government vs sub-sectors) suitable for the automatic processing of the large amount of monthly/quarterly fiscal data published nowadays by Spanish statistical authorities. Our tools are instrumental for ex-ante detection of risks to official projections, and thus can help in reducing the ex-post reputational costs of budgetary deviations. On the basis of our results, we discuss how official monitoring bodies could expand, on the one hand, their toolkit to evaluate regular adherence to targets (moving beyond a legalistic approach) and, on the other, their communication policies as regards sources of risks of (ex-ante) compliance with budgetary targets.
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We provide key stylised facts on fi scal policy developments in Spain over the past three decades using quarterly data (1986Q1-2012Q2). First, we compute stylised facts on the cyclical properties of fi scal policies over that period. Next, we report updated evidence on the macroeconomic effects of non-systematic fi scal policies, including updated estimates of their macroeconomic impact (fi scal multipliers) for alternative datasets. To perform the analysis in the paper we built up a comprehensive database of seasonally adjusted quarterly fi scal variables for the period of interest ; En este trabajo proporcionamos evidencia sobre las propiedades cíclicas y el impacto de la política fi scal en España, a lo largo de las últimas tres décadas, utilizando datos trimestrales (1 TR 1986-2 TR 2012). En primer lugar, analizamos la sincronía cíclica entre los agregados fi scales más relevantes y el crecimiento económico durante este período. En segundo lugar, nos centramos en los efectos macroeconómicos de la política fi scal no sistemática, proporcionando estimaciones actualizadas de un conjunto de multiplicadores fi scales. Para realizar el análisis anterior, en el artículo construimos una base de datos en la frecuencia trimestral que cubre, en particular, los principales agregados de la cuenta de las Administraciones Públicas para el período de interés
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