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In this editorial statement, we present a balance of the first decade of life of the European Journal of Government and Economics. We discuss the main difficulties an independent journal faces in maintaining the policy of open access and publication free of charge. We also renew the commitment to the journal's spirit, particularly with the editorial rigour and best practices. Finally, we identify the next steps in the consolidation of EJGE as an academic journal that attempts to keep an integrated approach between the fields of political science and economics.

In this editorial statement, we present a balance of the first decade of life of the European Journal of Government and Economics.We discuss the main difficulties an independent journal faces in maintaining the policy of open access and publication free of charge. We also renew the commitment to the journal's spirit, particularly with the editorial rigour and best practices.Finally, we identify the next steps in the consolidation of EJGE as an academic journal that attempts to keep an integrated approach between the fields of political science and economics.

[Abstract] The research objective of this paper is to find out the best predictor of internal devaluation measures imposed by governmental decision. There are two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, political instability may affect the implementation of internal devaluation due to opportunistic behavior and strategic thinking from the parties in power. On the other hand, governments also respond in real time to the signals from the financial markets with respect to the necessity of such measures. To accommodate for the contrasting hypotheses, we employ a panel dataset (2007-2017 Eurozone countries) with a fixed-effects model where the expected time in office of each cabinet (previously estimated using survival analysis) and the bond yields paid to issue public debt into financial markets, are explanatory variables. After controlling for other effects, the results show that expected time has no significant effect, while the yields do, something that might hint at a crisis of representation. ; [Resumen] El objetivo de este artículo es encontrar el mejor predictor de las medidas de devaluación interna implementadas por los gobiernos de los países de la eurozona. Con esta finalidad se someten a contraste dos hipótesis explicativas alternativas. Por un lado, la inestabilidad política puede afectar la implementación de la devaluación interna debido al comportamiento oportunista y al pensamiento estratégico de los partidos en el poder. Por el otro lado, los gobiernos responden en tiempo real a las señales que emiten los mercados financieros sobre la necesidad de adoptar tales medidas. Para poder probar empíricamente ambas hipótesis, se emplea un conjunto de datos de panel (países de la Eurozona 2007-2017) y se estima un modelo de efectos fijos donde el tiempo esperado en el cargo de cada gobierno (previamente estimado mediante análisis de supervivencia) y los rendimientos de los bonos públicos en los mercados financieros son variables explicativas. Después de controlar por otros efectos, los resultados muestran que el tiempo que un gobierno espera mantenerse en el poder no tienen un efecto significativo, mientras que los rendimientos de la deuda pública sí lo tienen, lo que podría indicar una crisis de representación.

This paper is concerned with measuring the seigniorage in Romania since the fall of communism and the potential gains after passing to euro. Starting from the balance sheet of the central bank, we estimated these levels of seigniorage for a period of 27 years. Our findings suggest that this source of revenue was at very high rates in the period of the 90's, mostly due to the huge prolonged inflation rates. Ever since the independence of the central bank, these levels of seigniorage dropped and became constant, at around 1-2% of the GDP. Also, we computed the potential gains due to euro adoption. We showed that as Romania converge with the rest of the Eurozone its seigniorage potential gains from euro adoption drops. Because these gains are only very small in relation to national income, we argue that the implications of giving up own currency are not budget related.

[Abstract]: The objective of this study is to analyze the role played by both fiscal and political decentralization as determinants of the expected time in office, understood as the latent (unobservable) durability of the cabinets. Using data for all the EU member states for the period that spans from 2007 up to 2017 and employing two competing survival analysis models, namely Weibull (parametric) and Cox (semiparametric), the results show that, even after controlling for other relevant variables (such as majority in legislative, the number of parties in government, the range between the most distant positions in coalition, etc.), decentralization (either fiscal or political) seem to be insignificant over the expected time in office of the cabinets. To the best of our knowledge there is only one study that focused on testing this kind of relationships, but which only considered the case of regional parties with portfolio positions (thus losing sight of the very important "supply and confidence agreements"). The originality of this works stems from the fact that we are more inclusive and that we employ new data and new variables that are more appropriate for framework of European politics, dominated by the anti-EU and populist debates, since the Great Recession of 2008.

[Abstract] This editorial statement reflects on the experience from the first five years of the European Journal of Government and Economics and proposes some broad ideas about what we believe should be the future of the journal in the following years. The developments and ideas presented here are divided in three parts: achievements and difficulties of the past five-year period, the renewal of the editorial team, and new challenges for the future

[Abstract] In this editorial statement we summarise some of the discussions we have had in the last months regarding the risks associated with the use of indicators for the measurement of research outputs, and how these risks should affect the management of the European Journal of Government and Economics. In particular, we focus on the consequences of the so-called Goodhart's law, which states that when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. We also explain the latest developments in the journal in the light of our previous editorial statements, and present our strategy for the upcoming years.

[Abstract] In this editorial statement we explain the developments in the European Journal of Government and Economics in its second year of existence. In this period, the journal has continued its international expansion, entered some new indices and started to experience its impact, as measured by the number of citations in other journals. After two years of publication, we have also learned some lessons that should help us redefine the role of EJGE.

[Abstract] In this editorial statement we explain the reasons for the creation of the European Journal of Government and Economics. We argue that there is a general shortage of academic journals. Although the new journal we are starting will not solve or significantly reduce this problem, it will represent a marginal step in the right direction. We also explain our views regarding some important aspects of the journal's policy, such as indexing and open access.

[Abstract] In this editorial statement we present a balance of the first year of life of the European Journal of Government and Economics. We discuss the main developments that concern the journal's indexation by academic databases. We also comment on the approval of a code of publication ethics and malpractice. Finally, we emphasise the dangers of excessive technical sophistication and the need to keep an integrated approach between the fields of political science and economics, according to the spirit of the journal.