Suchergebnisse

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: There are growing concerns that the public's trust in science is eroding, including concerns that vested interests are corrupting what we know about our food. We know the food industry funds third-party 'front groups' to advance its positions and profits. Here we ask whether this is the case with International Food Information Council (IFIC) and its associated Foundation, exploring its motivations and the potential for industry influence on communications around nutritional science. METHOD: We systematically searched the University of California San Francisco's Food Industry Documents Archive, for all documents pertaining to IFIC, which were then thematically evaluated against a science-communication influence model. RESULTS: We identified 75 documents which evidence that prominent individuals with long careers in the food industry view IFIC as designed to: 1) advance industry public relations goals; 2) amplify the messages of industry-funded research organizations; and 3) place industry approved experts before the press and media, in ways that conceal industry input. We observed that there were in some cases efforts made to conceal and dilute industry links associated with IFIC from the public's view. DISCUSSION: Instances suggesting IFIC communicates content produced by industry, and other industry-funded organisations like ILSI, give rise to concerns about vested interests going undetected in its outputs. IFIC's deployment to take on so-called "hard-hitting issues" for industry, summating evidence, while countering evidence that industry opposes, give rise to concerns about IFIC's purported neutrality. IFIC's role in coordinating and placing industry allies in online and traditional press outlets, to overcome industry's global scientific, legislative, regulatory and public relations challenges, leads also to concerns about it thwarting effective public health and safety measures. CONCLUSIONS: IFIC's promotion of evidence for the food industry should be interpreted as marketing strategy ...

Funder: Laura and John Arnold Foundation ; BACKGROUND: There are growing concerns that the public's trust in science is eroding, including concerns that vested interests are corrupting what we know about our food. We know the food industry funds third-party 'front groups' to advance its positions and profits. Here we ask whether this is the case with International Food Information Council (IFIC) and its associated Foundation, exploring its motivations and the potential for industry influence on communications around nutritional science. METHOD: We systematically searched the University of California San Francisco's Food Industry Documents Archive, for all documents pertaining to IFIC, which were then thematically evaluated against a science-communication influence model. RESULTS: We identified 75 documents which evidence that prominent individuals with long careers in the food industry view IFIC as designed to: 1) advance industry public relations goals; 2) amplify the messages of industry-funded research organizations; and 3) place industry approved experts before the press and media, in ways that conceal industry input. We observed that there were in some cases efforts made to conceal and dilute industry links associated with IFIC from the public's view. DISCUSSION: Instances suggesting IFIC communicates content produced by industry, and other industry-funded organisations like ILSI, give rise to concerns about vested interests going undetected in its outputs. IFIC's deployment to take on so-called "hard-hitting issues" for industry, summating evidence, while countering evidence that industry opposes, give rise to concerns about IFIC's purported neutrality. IFIC's role in coordinating and placing industry allies in online and traditional press outlets, to overcome industry's global scientific, legislative, regulatory and public relations challenges, leads also to concerns about it thwarting effective public health and safety measures. CONCLUSIONS: IFIC's promotion of evidence for the food industry should be interpreted as marketing strategy for those funders. Effective science communication may be obfuscated by undeclared conflicts of interests.

BACKGROUND: There is evidence that food industry actors try to shape science on nutrition and physical activity. But they are also involved in influencing the principles of scientific integrity. Our research objective was to study the extent of that involvement, with a case study of ILSI as a key actor in that space. We conducted a qualitative document analysis, triangulating data from an existing scoping review, publicly available information, internal industry documents, and existing freedom of information requests. RESULTS: Food companies have joined forces through ILSI to shape the development of scientific integrity principles. These activities started in 2007, in direct response to the growing criticism of the food industry's funding of research. ILSI first built a niche literature on COI in food science and nutrition at the individual and study levels. Because the literature was scarce on that topic, these publications were used and cited in ILSI's and others' further work on COI, scientific integrity, and PPP, beyond the fields of nutrition and food science. In the past few years, ILSI started to shape the very principles of scientific integrity then and to propose that government agencies, professional associations, non-for-profits, and others, adopt these principles. In the process, ILSI built a reputation in the scientific integrity space. ILSI's work on scientific integrity ignores the risks of accepting corporate funding and fails to provide guidelines to protect from these risks. CONCLUSIONS: The activities developed by ILSI on scientific integrity principles are part of a broader set of political practices of industry actors to influence public health policy, research, and practice. It is important to learn about and counter these practices as they risk shaping scientific standards to suit the industry's interests rather than public health ones. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12992-021-00689-1.