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Clements and Perner (Cognitive Development, 9 (1994), 377–397) reported that children show understanding of a story character's belief in their anticipatory looking responses before they show this in their answers to test questions. According to Clements and Perner the anticipatory looking responses provide evidence of implicit understanding of belief. This paper examines the possibility that the anticipatory looking measure is indicative of (a) children using a seeing = knowing rule, i.e. children linking not seeing with ignorance rather than a sensitivity to belief, or (b) a tendency to associate the protagonist with the left‐hand container. Thirty‐two children aged between 2 years 11 months and 4 years were told a false belief story similar to that used in Clements and Perner (1994) except that three containers were used instead of two. The protagonist first looks inside the middle box but then puts the object in the left‐hand box. In his absence, a second character moves the object unexpectedly to the right‐hand box. If children's anticipatory looking was based on sensitivity to belief then they should have looked clearly to the left‐hand box. If it was based on an association bias or sensitivity to the character not knowing then they should have looked equally to the left‐hand and middle boxes. The results were consistent with the former prediction suggesting that children's anticipatory looking responses may indeed be governed by an implicit sensitivity to belief.

We conducted a randomized controlled experiment to investigate the role of descriptive captions (positively and negatively worded) and ideological beliefs (Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation) on viewers' evaluations of two popular British Royal family members namely Meghan Markle and Kate Middleton. Participants included 300 undergraduate students from Dunedin, New Zealand who were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: (1) Pro-Kate, (2) Anti-Kate, (3) Pro-Meghan or (4) AntiMeghan captions accompanying the parallel images of these Royal members. We also included several distractor variables about other Royal family members and traditions. Outcomes were recorded as evaluations of six royal members (Charles, Diana, William, Harry, Kate, and Meghan). We found no significant effect of caption manipulation on outcome evaluations of Meghan and Kate. However, social dominance negatively correlated with Meghan and Harry whereas authoritarianism positively correlated with ratings of Charles. Our results indicate that a one-off exposure to biased media regarding celebrities may not significantly alter audience's evaluations of them, but ideological beliefs may influence this process, nonetheless.

AbstractThe contribution of children's social environment to their acquisition of theory of mind skills, combined with the well documented advantage for girls in mental state talk with siblings, peers and mothers, might lead to a female advantage on false belief tasks. We present a post‐hoc analysis of large datasets from two independent laboratories. A slight advantage for girls on false belief task performance was found in both datasets and was only apparent in younger but not older children. Language ability could be controlled for only in a smaller subsample of one dataset and cannot be ruled out as a potential mediator of this effect. However, if there is an age‐specific advantage for girls in false belief acquisition it is a weak effect only.

This study investigated whether mothers facilitate false belief understanding, and if so, what strategies are particularly relevant. The mothers of 64 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds were given questionnaires eliciting information about mother's education, mother's occupation, number of younger and older siblings, the time the child spends with mother, and about how mothers deal with five disciplinary situations with their child. Three variables were positively correlated with belief understanding: age, number of older siblings, and number of times mothers said they would respond to the disciplinary situations by asking the child to reflect on the victim's feelings (How Feel responses). These three variables had an independent effect on belief understanding because each was significant after accounting for the influence due to the other two variables. In contrast, there was no significant positive relation between belief understanding and mothers who engaged their child in general discussion and exploration of the disciplinary issues, or who simply reprimanded the child without discussing the situation. The effects for number of older siblings and How Feel responses remained even after the influence due to the child's age, verbal mental age, time spent with the mother, and number of younger siblings was accounted for. The results are consistent with recent research showing that parent‐child relations may be important for theory of mind understanding. More importantly, they provide insight into a specific strategy by which parents may help children learn about mental states.

AbstractMothers' use of mental state talk (MST) is linked to young children's performance on false belief tests of theory of mind (ToM) and to their behaviour in social contexts. However, little is known about MST beyond the early years. This investigation is the first to examine continuity in both mother and child MST from preschool (age 3–4 years) to middle childhood (age 10) and examines the role of early maternal MST in children's later ToM and use of MST. We examine the novel association between MST and children's behavioural adjustment from pre‐school into late childhood. Participants were mother–child dyads from a 7‐year longitudinal study. Measures of MST, ToM, and language were administered at home when children were 3 and 4 years old and again at the age of 10. Also at 10, behavioural adjustment was measured using the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire. Mother and child MST were highly stable from preschool to later childhood. Early maternal MST accounted for unique variance in later child MST and behavioural adjustment at 10 years of age; children whose mothers used more MST, specifically references to cognitions, when they were 3 or 4 experienced fewer behavioural difficulties (externalising behaviour) when they were 10 years old.

AbstractFalse‐belief understanding and executive functions are two main sociocognitive abilities reliably linked to child social competence. Although institution‐reared children are especially at risk for behavioral problems and cognitive delays, the role that executive function and false‐belief understanding might play in the social withdrawal of institutionalized children has not been examined. The current study used two‐wave data to investigate the concurrent and longitudinal relations of social withdrawal with executive function and false‐belief understanding in institutionalized children; it also allowed investigation of the directionality between executive function and false‐belief understanding. Data were collected from 66 Turkish children (T1 M = 57.83 months, SD = 9.20; T2 M = 69.58 months, SD = 8.45) residing in institutions, at two time points, approximately 1 year apart. We measured false‐belief understanding and executive function via individual assessments, and social withdrawal via care provider reports at both time points. Results showed that both executive function and false‐belief understanding increased between T1 and T2, while social withdrawal did not show a significant change. Path analysis revealed that when T1 age and language were controlled, T1 executive function predicted T2 executive function, and in turn, T2 executive function predicted lessened social withdrawal at T2. In addition, T1 executive function predicted T2 false‐belief understanding. T1 false‐belief understanding was not related to T2 false‐belief understanding, executive function, or social withdrawal. Findings suggested that executive function is an important predictor of social withdrawal in high‐risk populations.

AbstractThere are two broad views of children's theory of mind. The mentalist view is that it emerges in infancy and is possibly innate. The minimalist view is that it emerges more gradually in childhood and is heavily dependent on learning. According to minimalism, children initially understand behaviors rather than mental states, and they are assisted in doing so by recognizing repeating patterns in behavior. The regularities in behavior allow them to predict future behaviors, succeed on theory‐of‐mind tasks, acquire mental state words, and eventually, understand the mental states underlying behavior. The present study provided the first clear evidence for the plausibility of this view by fitting head cameras to 54 infants aged 6 to 25 months, and recording their view of the world in their daily lives. At 6 and 12 months, infants viewed an average of 146.5 repeated behaviors per hour, a rate consistent with approximately 560,000 repetitions in their first year, and with repetitions correlating with children's acquisition of mental state words, even after controlling for their general vocabulary and a range of variables indexing social interaction. We also recorded infants' view of people searching or searching for and retrieving objects. These were 92 times less common and did not correlate with mental state vocabulary. Overall, the findings indicate that repeated behaviors provide a rich source of information for children that would readily allow them to recognize patterns in behavior and help them acquire mental state words, providing the first clear evidence for this claim of minimalism.Research HighlightsSix‐ to 25‐month‐olds wore head cameras to record home life from infants' point‐of‐view and help adjudicate between nativist and minimalist views of theory‐of‐mind (ToM).Nativists say ToM is too early developing to enable learning, whereas minimalists say infants learn to predict behaviors from behavior patterns in environment.Consistent with minimalism, infants had an incredibly rich exposure (146.5/h, >560,000 in first year) to repeated behaviors (e.g., drinking from a cup repeatedly).Consistent with minimalism, more repeated behaviors correlated with infants' mental state vocabulary, even after controlling for gender, age, searches witnessed and non‐mental state vocabulary.

AbstractRight‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) predict prejudice and discrimination in adults. To create analogous scales for children, we carried out four studies. First, we gave 112 adults from New Zealand (Study 1) and 146 adults from Turkey (Study 2) novel child‐appropriate measures of RWA and SDO, along with the standard adult measures. The two RWA measures correlated more highly with each other than with the SDO measures, and the two SDO measures correlated more highly with each other than with the RWA measures. Study 3 tested 75 children aged 6 to 12, finding acceptable to good reliability for the two child scales. Child RWA (RWAc) and SDO (SDOc) decreased significantly over age. SDOc correlated with maternal SDO and RWA, and RWAc correlated with children's racial bias. Study 4 examined the RWAc scale with 39 children aged 5 to 11 years. There was good reliability for the RWAc scale and a correlation with anti‐fat prejudice. Overall, the findings indicate that: (a) the scales are reliable, (b) SDOc correlates with parental attitudes, (c) RWAc correlates with children's prejudice, and (d) RWA and SDO are present early in life and decline with age.