Rationalising Choice with Multi-self Models
In: The Economic Journal, Band 125, Heft 585, S. 1136-1156
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In: The Economic Journal, Band 125, Heft 585, S. 1136-1156
In: Journal of political economy microeconomics, Band 1, Heft 3, S. 447-462
ISSN: 2832-9368
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Working paper
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Working paper
In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1925
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Working paper
In: American economic review, Band 112, Heft 5, S. 1522-1554
ISSN: 1944-7981
We study bargaining over contingent contracts in problems where private information becomes public or verifiable when the time comes to implement the agreement. We suggest a simple, two-stage game that incorporates important aspects of bargaining. We characterize equilibria in which parties always reach agreement, and study their limits as bargaining frictions vanish. Under mild regularity conditions, we show all interim-efficient limits belong to Myerson's (1984) axiomatic solution. Furthermore, all limits must be interim efficient if equilibrium beliefs satisfy no-signaling-what-you-don' t-know. Results extend to other bargaining protocols. (JEL C78, D82, D83, D86)
In: Journal of political economy, Band 122, Heft 6, S. 1203-1234
ISSN: 1537-534X