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How do new party systems evolve over time? This article argues that party system evolution requires the solution of coordination problems that voters face in early elections; this happens through a learning mechanism. Elections reveal information to voters, who update their beliefs about party viability and the distribution of voters' preferences and adjust their behaviour. The institutional setting, however, strongly conditions the pace of learning. Restrictive electoral systems (single-member district) accelerate learning through the harsh penalties they impose on miscoordination, while permissive ones (proportional representation) prolong it. Testing the argument on a district-level dataset in new democracies provides ample support; voters learn to cast fewer wasted votes over time and this happens faster in single-member district systems. The findings point to a trade-off between consolidation and representation; while party system evolution is facilitated by restrictive electoral systems, the presence of distinct social groups in the political arena is better served by permissive ones.

How do new party systems evolve over time? This article argues that party system evolution requires the solution of coordination problems that voters face in early elections; this happens through a learning mechanism. Elections reveal information to voters, who update their beliefs about party viability and the distribution of voters' preferences and adjust their behaviour. The institutional setting, however, strongly conditions the pace of learning. Restrictive electoral systems (single-member district) accelerate learning through the harsh penalties they impose on miscoordination, while permissive ones (proportional representation) prolong it. Testing the argument on a district-level dataset in new democracies provides ample support; voters learn to cast fewer wasted votes over time and this happens faster in single-member district systems. The findings point to a trade-off between consolidation and representation; while party system evolution is facilitated by restrictive electoral systems, the presence of distinct social groups in the political arena is better served by permissive ones.

This article examines the effect of electoral misconduct on party systems in new electoral regimes. The authors distinguish between different forms of electoral misconduct and argue that preelection tools-which aim to deter opposition parties and their supporters and create a biased information environment-exert a "psychological" effect on parties and voters, whereas ballot fraud exerts a direct, "mechanical" effect on vote shares. Using original data on electoral misconduct in legislative elections in Latin America and postcommunist countries, the authors find that preelection misconduct has a strong reductive effect on the effective number of parties; however, ballot fraud does not. Further investigation suggests that intimidation of opposition parties and voters is the most important mechanism through which misconduct reduces party numbers. By identifying electoral misconduct as a key omitted variable, this article renders the conventional model of party systems more applicable to the political contexts in new electoral regimes. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Der Beitrag in der Festschrift für Peter Schmidt betrachtet die Wahlbeteiligung in neuen Demokratien. Zunächst geht der Beitrag auf die unterschiedlichen Arbeitsweisen der Autoren und des Gewürdigten ein und beschreibt anschließend Theorie und Daten der skizzierten Analyse. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die Wahlbeteiligung und ihre Veränderungen im Zusammenhang mit dem jeweiligen Wahlsystem. Dabei geht es um die Analyse der Auswirkungen, die z. B. die Einschätzung des Wählers auf seine möglichen Einflussmöglichkeiten auf die Wahlbeteiligung hat. (wie z. B. mit Wahlstimmen umgegangen wird, die kleineren, schwächeren Parteien zufließen). Der Beitrag beschreibt das Modell einer solchen Analyse, bei dem der Versuch unternommen wurde Rationalität und Lernprozess bei Wahlen mittels aggregierter Daten zu ermitteln. (ICB2).

This article examines the effect of electoral misconduct on party systems in new electoral regimes. The authors distinguish between different forms of electoral misconduct and argue that preelection tools—which aim to deter opposition parties and their supporters and create a biased information environment—exert a "psychological" effect on parties and voters, whereas ballot fraud exerts a direct, "mechanical" effect on vote shares. Using original data on electoral misconduct in legislative elections in Latin America and postcommunist countries, the authors find that preelection misconduct has a strong reductive effect on the effective number of parties; however, ballot fraud does not. Further investigation suggests that intimidation of opposition parties and voters is the most important mechanism through which misconduct reduces party numbers. By identifying electoral misconduct as a key omitted variable, this article renders the conventional model of party systems more applicable to the political contexts in new electoral regimes.

The effects of electoral systems have been tested recently in Africa, raising several questions: Are the systematic effects of electoral rules the same across regime types? Does the conduct of elections affect the process of strategic coordination between voters and parties? The literature to date has not considered these issues and also analyzes elections in settings where a crucial set of its assumptions are clearly violated. The authors argue that the mechanism of strategic coordination only operates in democracies that hold free and fair elections, and they exhibit the ways it is violated outside of this domain. They compile a new data set on sub-Saharan African elections and show that the interaction of electoral rules and ethnopolitical cleavages predicts the number of parties only in democratic settings, failing to produce substantive effects in nondemocratic ones. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2008.]

The effects of electoral systems have been tested recently in Africa, raising several questions: Are the systematic effects of electoral rules the same across regime types? Does the conduct of elections affect the process of strategic coordination between voters and parties? The literature to date has not considered these issues and also analyzes elections in settings where a crucial set of its assumptions are clearly violated. The authors argue that the mechanism of strategic coordination only operates in democracies that hold free and fair elections, and they exhibit the ways it is violated outside of this domain. They compile a new data set on sub-Saharan African elections and show that the interaction of electoral rules and ethnopolitical cleavages predicts the number of parties only in democratic settings, failing to produce substantive effects in nondemocratic ones.

Electoral observation missions (EOM) are designed to promote improvements in democratic quality by overseeing elections, but how successful are they? We argue that EOM tie the hands of incumbents, who have to adjust their electoral misconduct strategies, thus opening up political competition and making it more likely that the opposition will do well. Moreover, we propose that monitoring effects are conditioned by regime type, expecting that EOM presence has a stronger impact on electoral competition in autocracies than in democracies. Using a dataset of 580 parliamentary and presidential elections in 108 countries between 1976 and 2009 we find support for our theoretical claims. EOM increase electoral competitiveness in dictatorships by reducing margins of victory for incumbents, but leave competition unaffected in democracies. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that, contrary to previous findings, EOM increase the probability of electoral turnover in dictatorships but have no effect on democracies.

Why are some small parties successful whereas others wither away? Despite the voluminous literature on parties and party families, we have a limited understanding of what explains small party success. Most studies tend to emphasize the role of social cleavages and electoral systems. Instead, we propose a new institutional explanation that treats entering parliament as a key resource for small parties. Parliamentary entrance signals organizational capacity and candidates' appeal, and reduces uncertainty about parties' ideological profile. Taking advantage of the discontinuities generated by thresholds of representation, we estimate the causal effect of entering parliament on the future vote shares of small parties. We use a new data set that covers all post-WWII democracies with a national threshold of representation. Results indicate that presence in parliament increases parties' vote share in the next election. Importantly, entering parliament is more important for parties in new democracies, where party branding is weak and the need for signaling is high.

Why are some small parties successful whereas others wither away? Despite the voluminous literature on parties and party families, we have a limited understanding of what explains small party success. Most studies tend to emphasize the role of social cleavages and electoral systems. Instead, we propose a new institutional explanation that treats entering parliament as a key resource for small parties. Parliamentary entrance signals organizational capacity and candidates' appeal, and reduces uncertainty about parties' ideological profile. Taking advantage of the discontinuities generated by thresholds of representation, we estimate the causal effect of entering parliament on the future vote shares of small parties. We use a new data set that covers all post-WWII democracies with a national threshold of representation. Results indicate that presence in parliament increases parties' vote share in the next election. Importantly, entering parliament is more important for parties in new democracies, where party branding is weak and the need for signaling is high. Adapted from the source document.